New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Dissertations

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Spring 5-31-2013

Enabling sustainable power distribution networks by using smart
grid communications
Chun-Hao Lo
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations
Part of the Electrical and Electronics Commons

Recommended Citation
Lo, Chun-Hao, "Enabling sustainable power distribution networks by using smart grid communications"
(2013). Dissertations. 370.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations/370

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

Copyright Warning & Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.”
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user
may be liable for copyright infringement,
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order
would involve violation of copyright law.
Please Note: The author retains the copyright while the
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to
distribute this thesis or dissertation
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #” on the print dialog screen

The Van Houten library has removed some of the
personal information and all signatures from the
approval page and biographical sketches of theses
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of
NJIT graduates and faculty.

ABSTRACT
ENABLING SUSTAINABLE POWER DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS BY USING
SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS
by
Chun-Hao Lo
Smart grid modernization enables integration of computing,

information and

communications capabilities into the legacy electric power grid system, especially
the low voltage distribution networks where various consumers are located.

The

evolutionary paradigm has initiated worldwide deployment of an enormous number of
smart meters as well as renewable energy sources at end-user levels. The future distribution
networks as part of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) will involve decentralized
power control operations under associated smart grid communications networks. This
dissertation addresses three potential problems anticipated in the future distribution
networks of smart grid: 1) local power congestion due to power surpluses produced by
PV solar units in a neighborhood that demands disconnection/reconnection mechanisms to
alleviate power overflow, 2) power balance associated with renewable energy utilization as
well as data traffic across a multi-layered distribution network that requires decentralized
designs to facilitate power control as well as communications, and 3) a breach of data
integrity attributed to a typical false data injection attack in a smart metering network that
calls for a hybrid intrusion detection system to detect anomalous/malicious activities.
In the first problem, a model for the disconnection process via smart metering
communications between smart meters and the utility control center is proposed. By
modeling the power surplus congestion issue as a knapsack problem, greedy solutions for

solving such problem are proposed. Simulation results and analysis show that computation
time and data traffic under a disconnection stage in the network can be reduced.
In the second problem, autonomous distribution networks are designed that take
scalability into account by dividing the legacy distribution network into a set of
subnetworks. A power-control method is proposed to tackle the power flow and power
balance issues. Meanwhile, an overlay multi-tier communications infrastructure for the
underlying power network is proposed to analyze the traffic of data information and control
messages required for the associated power flow operations. Simulation results and analysis
show that utilization of renewable energy production can be improved, and at the same time
data traffic reduction under decentralized operations can be achieved as compared to legacy
centralized management.
In the third problem, an attack model is proposed that aims to minimize the number
of compromised meters subject to the equality of an aggregated power load in order to
bypass detection under the conventionally radial tree-like distribution network. A hybrid
anomaly detection framework is developed, which incorporates the proposed grid sensor
placement algorithm with the observability attribute. Simulation results and analysis show
that the network observability as well as detection accuracy can be improved by utilizing
grid-placed sensors.
Conclusively, a number of future works have also been identified to furthering the
associated problems and proposed solutions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Electric power grid is one of the national critical infrastructures provisioned with reliability
and security assurance. After the Second Industrial Revolution, most parts of the grid
structure and operation have remained unchanged for decades [1, 2, 3]; many electric
facilities and equipment in the grid are based on old technologies except a few minor
improvements such as upgrades on material types and construction designs used for
transformers, transmission lines, electric poles, and insulators [4]. In addition to the fact
that utilities have monopolized electricity supplies and markets, several crucial factors
have seriously drawn attention to the necessity for consolidation of smart grid paradigms
and concepts: the dramatic growth in population, end-user electronic devices, global
greenhouse gas emissions, power consumption, and power outages.
The aging infrastructure has also brought up a dilemma for people in the power
industry regarding whether or not they should invest on replacing the life-expired
fossil fuel or nuclear power plants with renewable energy sources (RESs) such as
neighborhood/household-based photovoltaic (PV) solar and wind power systems. The grid
system is mostly proprietary and manipulated by a number of regional utility operators
in the deregulated electricity market. There is barely (real-time) communications in
distribution networks as compared to that in transmission networks that links the entire
distribution networks between power supplies and customers’ loads operated under a
passive system [5]. Smart grid development is envisaged to tackle the aforementioned
issues by integrating advanced computing, information and communications technologies
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2
(CICTs), as well as distributed RESs into the existing grid, especially into its distribution
networks.

1.1

Conventional Electric Power System

An electric power system is fundamentally composed of three operational sectors:
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution. Generation is a process of producing power
at various power plants by employing numerous types of energy resources, e.g., fossil
fuels, nuclear, and renewables. Transmission involves power delivery by ramping up
the power to high-voltage (HV, > 300kV) through step-up transmission transformers
for high energy delivery efficiency and ramping down the power to medium-voltage
(MV, > 100kV) through step-down transmission transformers before entering distribution
networks. Distribution delivers the power by further ramping it down to low-voltage (LV,
< 100kV) through step-down distribution transformers to various customers at the end-use
consumption sectors, i.e., residential, commercial, and industrial (RCI) users. Series of the
actions are regulated by a set of standards (e.g., IEEE, IEC, DNP, ANSI, CIP) [6, 7, 8]
as well as a batch of data collection and system automation [9]. Transmission lines
and distribution feeders connecting diverse electrical components and end-use customers
throughout the system construct the so-called power grid.

The four major network

components of the power grid are:
• Power facilities and equipment mainly comprise power generators, transformers,
stations, substations, and control centers in which electrical components1 are built
from multiple vendors.
1 Examples

of electrical components include conductors, protective devices, capacitors, reactors,
intelligent electronic devices, programmable logic controllers, and remote terminal units.

3
• Control systems installed in the power grid for wide-area monitoring and control
as well as substation and distribution automation, are typically the conventional
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition and Energy Management Systems
(SCADA/EMS) as well as the sophisticated synchrophasors Phasor Management
Units and Phasor Data Concentrators (PMU/PDC). SCADA typically measures
voltage, current, and frequency once every few seconds, whereas PMU/PDC delivers
more and complex samples per second; they are medically analogous to the X-ray
and MRI, respectively [10, 11].
• Data flows in the system carry various power factors and measurements for a number
of applications, including substation and feeder monitoring, Volt-VAR (voltageampere reactive) control, FDIR (fault detection, isolation and restoration/recovery),
transformer and motor temperatures, as well as the status of breakers, relays, and
switchgear.
• Communications protocols used in data exchange and management among
substations, are mostly proprietary and regulated by utilities, municipalities, or
regulators. Communications in the HV/MV transmission grid systems currently have
been administered under advanced and sophisticated control and monitoring as well
as computing tools.
The legacy power grid infrastructure particularly in the United States has mostly
been constructed in a centralized radial tree-like topology such that a single remote
generator supplies power to multiple groups of end users through transmission and
distribution lines. The infrastructure is greatly vulnerable to a single-point malfunction
(whether due to intentional or unintentional reasons) that can affect multiple served regions
through cascading failures, despite it is claimed reliable and controllable [12]. Moreover,
the centralized method has limited the improvement of system performance in terms
of network availability and operational flexibility [13]. The communications network
topology is organized in a master-slaves architecture, and communications technologies
used by utility companies vary from dedicated/private radio frequency (RF), fiber optics,
twisted-pair telephone line, powerline, to satellite. However, most of utilities’ operation
systems are proprietary and operate under their own wide area networks (WANs). The
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majority of communications are taken place in transmission networks among SCADA/EMS
and PMU/PDC systems, whereas almost the entire distribution network is passive (that
has little interaction between power system and loads) with limited communications
and local controls, and provides no real-time monitoring of voltage and current [5].
Power distribution and management in distribution networks are mostly controlled by
mechanical-electrical mechanisms and devices locally that are not optimized globally.
The current grid is considered energy inefficient from many aspects, and constrained
by its centralized architecture as well as a lack of communications and controls in
distribution and consumption sectors.

According to the U.S. Energy Information

Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Review 2009 [14], the efficiency of the current
power grid is as low as approximately 30% because of the loss in energy conversion at
power plants and the loss in transmission and distribution. The grid also suffers from
sudden spikes in power demand that can cause power congestion and low power quality
in consequence of brownouts or blackouts and equipment damages. The contemporary
sophisticated methods using protection systems and demand prediction tools mostly relied
on historical data are inefficient and expensive. Without penetrating distribution and
consumption levels of the grid extensively, balancing power supply and demand will
become more challenging in the near future.

1.2

Future Communications-Power Networked System: Smart Grid

Incorporating CICTs intelligence and distributed RESs into the distribution networks is
envisioned to modernize the conventional power grid system. While there does not exist
a perfect system in the world, smart grid development aims to moderate the effects of
catastrophes (e.g., natural disasters, human errors, intentional attacks), and at the same time

5

Figure 1.1 The next-generation distribution system: power grid towards smart grid.
to shorten the duration of recovery. Smart grid is designed to accommodate two-way data
communications and
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sector is foreseen to enhance operation efficiencies inPreference
remote
meter reading for customer

energy use, bidirectional power delivery for optimal power flow control, and Volt-VAR
regulation for reliable power quality locally and globally. Figure 1.1 illustrates the layered
power system network which is currently deployed or planned to be deployed in the near
future. As mentioned earlier, most works have focused on the generation and transmission
levels and only little effort has been made at the distribution and consumption levels.
Future networks in smart grid comprise Field Area Networks (FANs), Neighborhood Area
Networks (NANs), and Home Area Networks (HANs) that leave plenty of room for further
investigation and exploration of the next generation electric power system. On top of
the system, the smart grid communications infrastructure is layered into four essential
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Network type: Premises Area Network (PAN)
Coverage: Customer premises, industrial fields, distributed energy resources
Application: Home & building automation
Technologies: WiFi, ZigBee, HomePlug, 6LoWPAN, WirelessHART, ISA100.11a, etc.
Network type: Last mile - Neighborhood Area Network (NAN), Field Area Network (FAN),
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
Coverage/Application: The edge of power grid to smart grid data concentrators
Technologies: WiFi, WiMAX, GPRS, 3G, LTE, Fiber, BPL/PLC, Mesh RF, etc.
Network type: Backhaul
Coverage/Application: Smart grid concentrators to substation/distribution automation,
control systems/utilities' branches; broadband connectivity
Technologies: WiMAX, 3G, LTE, Fiber, mm-Wave, BPL, etc.
Network type: Core/Metro
Coverage/Application: Substations to utilities' headquarters; private networks
Technologies: SONET/SDH/DWDM, IP/MPLS, Ethernet, Satellite, etc.

Smart Grid

Figure 1.2 Smart grid communications networking layers.

networking sectors: core (or backbone, metro), middle-mile (or backhaul), last-mile (or
access, distribution), and premises, as shown
in Figure 1.2:
Reliability
Stability
Measurability

• The core sector operated under WAN supports the connection between numerous
Controllability
substations and utilities’ headquarters. This layer requires high capacity and
Flexibility
bandwidth availability to handle mountains
of data transported from other sectors
Scalability
as well as multiple agents. The backbone
network
is usually built on fiber optics.
Availability
Resiliency

• The middle-mile sector
the head of Advanced Metering
Sustainability
Infrastructure2 (AMI) connects the
data concentrators or aggregators with utility
control centers. This layer not onlyInteroperability
needs to provide broadband media for substation
and distribution automation, but theSecurity
associated network installation needs to be as
easy and cost-effective as possible.Optimization
In addition, routes and links through which data
flow in this portion ought to be flexible and uninterrupted. The overall performance
should also be highly predictable for reliable data transport before entering the core.
Maintainability
operated
under

• The last-mile sector mostly covers the areas of FAN and NAN in part of AMI.
This layer is responsible for data transport and collection from smart meters to
concentrators. There are a variety of wireline and wireless technologies available that
2 AMI

is a system between customers and utility operators in electricity and gas/water markets that
enables real-time data measurement as well as frequent data collection and transmission to the utility
operators and various parties.
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can be implemented in this sector. Tailored technologies must provision broadband
speed and security.
• The premises sector includes HANs, Building Area Networks (BANs), and
Industrial Area Networks (IANs). Communications technologies supporting home
and building automation in RCI sectors will be predominantly based on the IEEE
802.15.4, IEEE 802.11, and Power Line Communications (PLC) standards. Home
energy management operated in HANs will regulate numerous components, such
as thermostat, HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), smart appliances,
lighting control, electric vehicle (EV), and RESs. Data measurement, collection, and
transport of this network have to be stabilized, accurate, secured, and privacy-cared.
The four networking sectors interconnected with one another fundamentally
assemble the communications infrastructure for the overall smart grid.

They are

implemented with CICTs to facilitate power grid operation and management along with
smart grid technologies and applications, ranging from wide area monitoring that manages
the unprecedented number of distributed RESs and customer loads, demand response that
enables customer participation in adjusting consumption as well as becoming prosumers3 ,
RESs integration that produces renewable energy and reverse power flows back to the grid,
to EVs plug-and-play that charges and discharges power from and to the grid in systematic
arrangements. Table 1.1 presents various technologies for the smart grid communications
that will ultimately be adopted depending upon the associated network characteristics. For
example, small utilities may take the advantages of using the existing cellular networks
and collaborate with others to reduce capital and operating costs. On the contrary, large
utilities would be more capable of building their own networks to avoid bandwidth sharing
in order to earn more profits on the capital investment. Additionally, the geographical
requirements, task objectives, as well as applications and services to consumers will also
affect the choices of technologies deployment of the smart grid communications.
3 Customers are not only the electricity buyers , but also the electricity sellers capable of contributing

power surplus back to the grid if they have installed RESs on their premises.

Refrigerator
Clothes washer
TV
Lighting
Water Heater
Hair dryer
Clothes iron
Toster
Coffee maker
Microwave oven

500 ~ 1,000
350 ~ 500
50 ~ 200
60, 100
4,500 ~ 5,500
1,200 ~ 1,875
1,000 ~ 1,800
800 ~ 1,400
900 ~ 1,200
750 ~ 1,100

24 (hrs)
30 ~ 45 (mins)
3 ~ 6 (hrs)
5 ~ 10 (hrs)
40 gallons

optional

Table 1.1 Potential Technologies Supporting the Smart Grid Communications
Communications
Wireless
Technologies

Wireline
Technologies

Purposes & Description

Merits

Cellular
(GPRS/3G/4G) and
LTE

Voice-initiated; Remote monitoring
and control (e.g., SCADA) for
substations and distributed energy
sources; Simple text messaging
support

Low implementation, operational, and maintenance costs
using existing network infrastructures; Larger coverage;
Better roaming and mobility
support

Need for towers/base stations; Uneconomical call establishment on
large scales; Unavailable coverage
for some remote sites; Securityvulnerable

WiFi (IEEE 802.11)

Data (and video)-initiated; Home
energy interface; Connection among
PCs, laptops, PDAs, and customer
electronics, as well as smart metering solutions

Rapid installation; High flexibility; Solutions for aggregation points in urban areas

High interference-sensitivity; Small
coverage; Power-hungry; Uneconomical on small scales; Securityvulnerable

WiMAX (IEEE
802.16)

Last-mile wireless broadband
access alternative to Cable and
DSL; Smart metering network in
AMI

SONET/SDH and
E/GPON

Fiber optics-based; Broadband
solutions for core, metro, and access
networks

PLC (NB and BB)
and BPL

Network
Types

WMN

WSN and WPAN
(IEEE 802.15.4)

Proprietary
Dedicated or Private

Power-initiated; Particular communication channels in MV and LV
fields; BPL broadband access alternative to Cable and DSL
Mesh network supported in communities and neighborhoods; Super
mesh routers managing diverse
applications
Small measures; Home, office, and
smart appliance (energy) automation; Sensing, monitoring, control in
fields of substations, industrial
facilities, and distributed generation
Pre-assigned and possession of
mixed telecommunications technologies; Licensed spectrums

Fast deployment when compared to wired solutions;
Long-range; High speed for
real-time applications and fast
response
High bandwidth and large
capacity support; Fast transmission; Negligible interference

Weaknesses & Challenges

Need for towers/base stations; Low
penetration while operating in very
high frequency bands; High power
consumption; Security-vulnerable
Slow deployment and high cost installation if no existing infrastructure
available especially in rural areas

Easy and cost-effective installation; High reliability and
flexibility; Self-configuration
and healing

Complex implementation for larger
buildings; Phase switch challenge
from indoor to outdoor and vice
versa; Signal attenuation and high
cost for repeaters deployment in
localized areas; High interference
over power lines
High complexity in data management; Low controllability in unlicensed spectrums; Lack of standards;
Overheads

Easy and rapid deployment;
Low cost; High portability;
Easy configuration

Power and memory constrained; Low
data rate; Higher data loss; Very low
coverage

Less security-vulnerable; No
sharing in bandwidth as well
as profits on capitals; Higher
independence

Lower flexibility and manageability;
Very high installation cost

Complementing cable and
wireless solutions; Easy installation for indoors; Higher
flexibility and mobility for
end devices; Solutions for
rural areas
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Enterprises

Industrial Area Network
(IAN)

Operation
Control Centers

Service Providers
Wholesalers

Data Centers

WAN

Building Area Network
(BAN)
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Figure 1.3 Smart grid ecosystem.

HV Pole
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Figure 1.3 illustrates the entire smart grid overview in which a number of anticipated
future networks deployed in the distribution and consumption sectors are going to evolve
gradually from now. It is envisioned that enormous amounts of measurement data, control
messages, and price signals will be required to run these emerging applications. Different
applications may have different QoS (quality of service) and delay requirements. Notably,
the sizes of mice data conveyed in smart grid are approximately tens of bytes for protection,
control, monitoring applications and tens to hundreds of bytes for metering/billing, EV
applications [15, 16]; the response time is in the order of a few seconds for the former
applications and minutes or hours for the latter applications. For such reasons, efficient and
effective communications and computation designs for associated power management are
considerably desired.

1.3

Similarities between Power Network and Communications Network

Interestingly, the functionality of power systems has similar characteristics found in the
Internet [17], in terms of network and operation designs. Essentially, both systems aim
to deliver network resources from source to destination through optimized routes by using
strategic algorithms while avoiding any congested and/or broken links. The similarities
include
• Network nodes: power plants and energy storage, control centers, substations
and transformers, circuit breakers and switches, and consumers versus content
sources and data storage, service providers, terminals, edge/intermediate routers and
switches, and subscribers.
• Network links: Power transmission cables and distribution feeders versus
communications wireline cables and wireless links.
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• Network topologies: Centralized infrastructure in power networks (designed to
be decentralized in smart grid) versus hybrid infrastructures and ad-hoc mesh in
communications networks.
• Network electron resources: Electricity versus analog and digital data.
• Network transfer capabilities:
communications channel bandwidth.

Power

transmission

capacity

versus

• Network operations: Power versus data traffic load balancing via routing and
switching across both networks.
Managing power delivery in the power network system is similar to organizing
data packets transmission in communications network system, and yet they should be
addressed and designed simultaneously because both real-time operations can be the cause
and effect to one another. For example, implementing hundreds of thousands of smart
meters in the consumption sector requires a scalable framework to instantly coordinate
power circuitry control and data traffic. On the one hand, data packets delayed or dropped
during transmission may incur increased electricity costs, energy inefficiency, or service
interruption for the power system. On the other hand, if packet generation at smart meters
is initiated by an event (e.g., a change in power flow direction) that is required to notify
utility operators, the increasing traffic loads in communications networks may become
more challenging to handle, and eventually deteriorate the network performance for both
power and communications systems.
Data communications in smart grid plays a dominant role for the power system
to function consistently while the efficiency of power transmission is also substantially
dependent upon the advanced electric power facilities and technologies tailored for the
grid system. Moreover, the performance of data transmission further relies upon how
well the heterogeneous communications networks across smart grid are interconnected
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and integrated. Conclusively, understanding power operations and features prior to the
design of associated communications network operations is the key to build a completely
integrated communications-power networked system for smart grid. This dissertation has
been motivated to explore the frontiers of communications-power system integration, in
which power surplus congestion, network scalability, and cyber-physical security are the
three primarily foreseeable problems to be studied for the future power distribution system.
For the first two problems, power control mechanisms and associated communications
networking designs are developed to resolve the power issues, and at the same time to
mitigate the corresponding heavy data traffic loads required for the resolution. For the third
problem, a hybrid intrusion detection framework that incorporates grid sensor placement
is proposed to effectively enhance fault detection of anomalous and malicious activities
under a circumstance where some smart meters are compromised or smart metering
communications is breached.

1.4

Outlines for the Remaining Chapters

The remaining chapters are outlined as follows:
Chapter 2 presents necessary backgrounds and related works for the three addressed
problems as well as the existing proposed solutions, respectively.
Chapter 3 addresses the issue of local power congestion due to power surpluses
produced by household-based PV solar units in a neighborhood. The problem is formulated
as a knapsack problem to disconnect some PV solar units from the grid in order to alleviate
congestion. Heuristic selection algorithms for candidate disconnection are proposed based
on greedy methods. A framework of smart metering communications using wireless
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technologies in NAN and a mechanism for exchanging measurement data and control
messages are proposed to reduce traffic loads during the disconnection periods.
Chapter 4 further addresses the issue of bidirectional power flow where some
households consume grid power while others supply power surpluses produced by
household-based PV solar units in a distribution network. The problem is formulated as
a power balance problem in which power balance may not be achieved within a micro
grid itself, and therefore power sharing (or redispatching) from neighboring micro grids
is initiated prior to requesting power from the macro grid, i.e., the HV transmission
grid. The scalable Control Of Power flow dirEction (COPE) and Power Control and
Communications (PCC) algorithms with Overlay multi-tier Communications Network
Infrastructure (OCNI) are proposed to facilitate power flow management in the underlying
Autonomous Distribution Networks (ADNs) as well as to reduce the amount of traffic loads
throughout the OCNI.
Chapter 5 addresses the issue of energy theft initiated by one illegal customer
launching a typical false data injection attack in a distribution network. The problem is
formulated as a COmbiNation SUM of Energy pRofiles (CONSUMER) attack problem
that compromises a number of smart meters in a coordinated manner such that lower power
consumption is metered for the attacker and higher consumption for its neighbors. A
hybrid intrusion detection framework which incorporates POwer Information and SEnsor
placement (POISE) with the Grid-Placed Sensor (GPS) algorithm is proposed to provide
network observability throughout the distribution network while being able to validate the
correctness of customers energy usage by detecting anomalous and malicious activities at
the consumption level.
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and discusses the future work.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUNDS AND RELATED WORKS

The power grid system essentially entails Volt-VAR control, power flow management,
and fault detection and isolation. In the past years, most of research works related
to grid reliability have only focused on 1) current carrying from power generation,
transmission, to distribution lines consisting of a number of transformers, buses, and
circuit breakers, and 2) protection system interacting with the current carrying methods
that can be affected by the performance of protective relays, reclosers, and the associated
hardware [18]. As the smart grid vision has emerged recently, there have been limited
research works on modeling telecommunications and distributed computing for the next
generation grid operation. Imperatively, the cyber-physical system requires preliminary
investigations into communications network modeling as well as system vulnerability
analysis [19, 20, 21, 22] in order to cope with unprecedented design challenges in terms
of future power network characteristics, communications network characteristics, and
cyber-physical security threats, under the ongoing smart grid development.

2.1

Power Network Congestion

The centralized and radial tree-like power grid suffers from peak demands and
corresponding power congestion.

In order to alleviate traditional power congestion

occurred in the MV and LV distribution networks, distributed energy resource (DER)
units are anticipated to be located near customers’ sites to provide local power supplies
effectively to serve local loads. Such transformation results in the construction of multiple
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micro grids (MGs) in the distribution system consisting of interconnected loads, RESs,
and energy storage.

The MG can be considered as a manageable generating-source

or consuming-source region/entity depending on the status of power generation and
consumption in its local area at certain time periods. The MG is operated in two modes:
grid-connected mode and islanded mode [23, 24]. In the grid-connected mode, customers
may be supplied by power from both the macro (main) grid and MG. When an incident
(e.g., voltage drop, faults) is detected in the macro grid, MGs may automatically switch to
the islanded mode until the incident is resolved. Most research works have devoted to the
islanded operation and the transition between islanded and grid-connected modes [25].
The proliferation of distributed generation deployed in MG and neighborhoods will
further increase the penetration of DER units and local generation capacity. Installing solar
panels on rooftops of houses and buildings has dramatically increased recently in various
countries. Customers may use solar energy they produce from the solar units to operate
their household appliances and personal electronics. Any extra energy that is unused will
flow back to the utility grid for credits on their bills, i.e., in the case of a grid-tie system.
Note that local power congestion can potentially occur in the distribution grid once local
distributed generation becomes more prevalent in the future [26]; too much solar power or
surge in solar power may incur local congestion and deterioration in power grids during the
low-consumption and high-production periods. Therefore, bidirectional power flow in grid
distribution has to be managed and monitored via smart metering communications in the
distribution network system.
Congestion management methods are required for deregulated electricity markets to
resolve power congestion that occurs when there is not enough transmission capacity to
support all demands for deliveries (transactions) that cannot be physically implemented
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as requested [27, 28]. Congestion management employed in the power system has been
developed based on a number of methods, including spot pricing theory, optimization
model, and variants of optimal power flow techniques [29, 28, 30]. While utilities tackle
the congestion problem using their own rules and bidding strategies, all of them aim to
maximize their profits (minimize overall cost) by using tools such as unit commitment
(UC) and economic dispatch (ED) in the competitive electric industry [31], where UC
refers to scheduling generation units to match the forecast load and ED is adopted to meet
the unexpected risen loads [32]. Essentially, cost-free methods1 are firstly applied when
congestion is revealed in the interconnected network. If congestion cannot be relieved,
not-cost-free methods2 are required to tackle the remaining unresolved issues [28, 29]. In
either case, congestion management in power flow analysis is affected by both technical
(security and stability) and economic (wholesale market price) aspects, which are usually
contradictory.
Traditional congestion management and control is considered passive since most
methods focus on redispatching/rescheduling generation from the supply side. Congestion
management is claimed be more effective if demand control can be combined with supply
management [33, 28, 30]. In an analogy between supply and demand in power and
communications networks, congestion control usually managed at the transport layer of
the OSI model (e.g., TCP) in communications networks is effectively employed to reduce
senders’ transmitting rates when the network is congested. Hence, instead of meeting user
1 Cost-free methods include outing congested lines and utilizing the flexible AC transmission system

(FACTS) to manage the power flow. They are called cost-free because their marginal costs are
nominal.
2 Not-cost-free methods include rescheduling and redispatching power generation in such a way that
the power flow in transmission lines is more balanced throughout the network. This approach is
more expensive because some generators may need to reduce their power generation while some
are required to increase their output.
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demands when a system can barely sustain, curtailing loads sometimes can dramatically
improve system performance especially when a considerable amount of power or data are
destined for the same destination. In fact, various demand response designs in smart grid
projects are being deployed in the end-use sector including residential and commercial
buildings [13, 21, 34].
An increasing number of research papers have focused on the implementation of
energy management and scheduling techniques in houses and buildings [35, 36, 37, 38].
Shifting some major tasks of household appliances to off-peak periods and managing DER
use efficiently during peak hours can achieve reduction in both energy cost and peak load.
Erol-Kantarci and Mouftah [35] proposed a wireless sensor HAN based on IEEE 802.15.4
to manage the time use of household appliances depending on the availability of its local
energy. A simple communications protocol with an energy management unit (EMU)
deployed in houses was developed. Prior to energy use by consumers, communications
between the EMU and appliances as well as between the EMU and energy storage are
established. Energy is granted if energy in storage is available. Consumers have the
option whether to consume the grid power or not when energy in storage is insufficient.
Mohsenian-Rad et al. [36] proposed a strategy that enables communications among
households as a group demand-side management to minimize both energy cost and demand
peak-to-average ratio. Local optimization using game theory to curb aggressive consumers
is achieved. Similarly, Ibars et al. [39] identified a congestion game in demand and
generation management as one of potential games in game theory. A load balancing
mechanism was proposed to avoid power overload and outage by minimizing the cost
(which is a function of the congestion level) on the flow along the transmission lines
between a single generation and multiple consumers. Molderink et al. [37] proposed
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the three-step methodology (prediction, planning, and real-time control) to optimize the
utilization of the grid power in a neighborhood by exchanging energy profiles among
houses. Energy profiles are generated from local controllers installed in houses and
aggregated for delivery to the global controller to make a global decision. Pedrasa et al.
[38] proposed to maximize the profit of DER operation by scheduling DER in cooperation
by using particle swarm theory. Notably, congestion is also foreseen in plug-in hybrid
EV charging if the charging management is not handled properly in the distribution grid.
One way to mitigate the problem is using queuing theory [40] to reduce the probability of
overload by balancing the charging loads over time.

2.2

Power Two-way Directional Flow

Smart distribution introduces the concept of active/autonomous distribution networks
(ADNs) in cooperation with distributed grid intelligence [41], multi-agent systems
[42, 43, 44, 45], and active network management [46, 47]. ADNs are composed of
multiple MGs, smart inverters, and intelligent distribution transformers that perform system
(re)configuration management, power management, and fault detection management.
Local controls for these key components can be achieved through fast control and
communications, and need to be coordinated with the overall system controls. From the
power network perspective, the primary issue for the power distribution operation with high
penetration levels of DER units is Volt-VAR control as well as power flow management
[48, 49, 44, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54]. In Volt-VAR control, for example, the variability of outputs
of PV power generation subject to cloud transients would incur voltage harmonics and
fluctuations, which could be detrimental to the distribution system. Smart inverters with
PV and distributed storage systems can possibly control the voltage on the distribution
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system by providing power when the voltage is low and by absorbing power when the
voltage is high [55]. In power flow management, surpluses of power produced by DERs
can be shared among the households as well as delivered to the neighboring distribution
networks; this provision requires bidirectional power flows. Note that the reverse power
flow from the distribution network back to the transmission network is prohibited in some
countries, e.g., Japan [51].
While customers’ houses and line feeders with electric poles will be implemented
with smart meters and smart actuators/sensors, respectively, the distribution system can
be seen as a large version of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in which the nodes are
strategically and statically deployed. Smart sensors can integrate communications with
control functions in order to optimize system performance. From the communications
network design standpoint, the centralized schemes (i.e., master-slaves relationship)
applied in the legacy power system will become impractical once the size of distribution
networks grows to a certain extent. Scalability has been extensively studied in wireless ad
hoc and sensor networks [56] as well as addressed in the context of smart grid applications
[57, 58]. Clustering is one primary technique that is adopted in WSN by breaking its
network into multiple subnetworks to improve network performance and energy efficiency.
Similar strategies such as partitioning [59, 60] and multilevel partitioning [61] tactics may
also be applied to the distribution network and its overlay communications network in
order to perform load balancing as well as to reduce power and communications costs in a
decentralized and distributed manner. The costs for the power system may refer to power
disturbance, power congestion, and power loss, whereas the costs for the communications
system may indicate control overheads, signal interference, and data packet loss. In
comparison with the conventional methods, several studies [62, 60, 63] have shown that

v14

v11
v12
v13
v14
v15

v15

5
5
5
6
6

v8
v8
v10
v11
v13

8
3
5
-4
2

(a)
Substation
transformer

Power from
macro grid

(v11,v8)
(v12,v8)
(v13,v10)
(v11,v14)
(v15,v13)

3

1
Distribution
line feeder

Smart meter
PV inverter

Smart meter
PV inverter
3

1
2

Bus

20

(b)

Supplementary
regulator
Capacity
control

Voltage (p.u.)

4
3
7
4
2

Sensors

LTC control

2
Smart meter
PV inverter

Acceptable
range

Drop

Coordination of Volt and VAR
regulation

Distance
(a)

(b)

Figure 2.1 (a) Voltage profile for a typical distribution feeder, and (b) coordination via
communications and control in the distribution network.
distributed control and management is a preferable approach to the designs of both power
and communications networks for the future smart grid.
Electric power grid exhibits the characteristics of a small-world network [64];
however,
Wang et al. [65] discovered that its grid topology is in fact very sparsely
h1,i , h2,i , , h j ,i  g i , i  1, 2, , k
g , g , , g  c , i  1, 2, , s

1,i
2,i
k ,i
i
connected
with
a very low average nodal degree (2-5), and Hines et al. [66] indicated that

electrical and physical distances can be influential factors which have not been extensively
studied in the context of structural network analysis, e.g., voltage drop [50, 67]. As
an example shown in Figure 2.1a, HV power is generated from the macro grid and
ramped down to LV power to serve loads of customer 1, 2, and 3 in the distribution
network. Voltage is decreased along the feeder as the distance increases. Voltage drop
is discovered explicitly for customer 1 and 3 due to the increased current flow on the
feeder while customers’ power consumption (or loads) increase. The consequence causes
decreased voltage for customers approaching the end of the feeder from the substation;
nevertheless, voltage has to be maintained within an acceptable range (e.g., 120V±5%)
along the feeder by utilizing capacitor banks. The control of voltage and active/reactive
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power becomes more challenging for the operation of power distribution systems when
the penetration level of DER units rises, with inclusion of plug-in EVs [54]. Volt-VAR
control involves voltage regulating devices such as load tap changer (LTC) at the substation
transformer, distribution sensors/supplementary regulators and capacitor banks along the
feeder (on or close to electric poles), and smart meters with PV inverters at houses
from which voltage information is collected in real time. Coordination by means of
integrated control and communications along with the distribution equipment controllers
can efficiently regulate voltage, reduce losses, conserve energy, and optimize utilization
of system resources. Reference [67] introduces the smart distribution integrated Volt-VAR
control and optimization as shown in Figure 2.1b.
The direction and amount of power flow in distribution networks require flexible and
dynamic control operation [68]. The existing distribution networks were not designed to
operate with bidirectional power flow; nonetheless, introducing appropriately specific loops
techniques and developing a hybrid structure to enable meshed operation in the legacy
radial system with intelligent circuit breakers and switches are potential approaches to
provision the two-way power system in the future [69]. Nguyen et al. [45] proposed a
distributed optimal routing algorithm with a power router interface to manage the power
flow in the ADN. Moreover, the so-called contactless and bidirectional power transfer
system compensated by an inductor-capacitor-inductor circuit has been proposed in [70, 71]
and claimed to be a viable solution for smart grid applications, e.g., DERs, EVs.
Numerous literatures have been proposed to integrate CICTs into the current
power systems [51, 47, 72, 73, 74, 44, 45, 48, 43, 53, 49, 75, 72, 76, 77, 78],
including consideration of secure communications [79]. Particularly, Yang et al. [47]
proposed communications infrastructures for MV and LV distribution networks. By using
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microwave/T1 for MV network and satellite/T1 for LV network, the authors showed that
these technologies can coexist and meet the delay requirement for data delivery. Majumder
et al. [53] also designed communications systems using WSN to manage power flow within
MGs and adopting wired network to support data exchange among MGs or communities.
The low-cost and low-bandwidth WSN was proved to be sufficient to deliver local data
measurements, and at the same time was able to improve the system reliability and
operation accuracy. Furthermore, Erol-Kantarci et al. [73] considered multiple MGs
throughout the distribution network where each MG can represent residential, commercial,
and campus entities. Multiple MGs are grouped together as long as their outputs are
balanced, i.e., power surplus is equal to consumption. In order to achieve survivability, the
method is to form a ring topology (i.e., at least three MGs must be grouped) so that they
can support each other. Because of varying power usage and production in geographical
regions, group formation changes during different time periods. Meanwhile, partitioning
MGs of distribution networks based on coalition game theory was introduced in [74].
Coalitions of MGs are formed according to the coalition formation algorithm incorporated
with merge-split rules in which the tradeoff (i.e., power loss) value is determined for each
MG whether to merge with other coalitions (or split from its coalition), until the network
converges to a number of disjoint coalitions where there is no more incentive to further
merge or split.

2.3

Energy Theft and False Data Injection Attack

During the evolutional movement in smart grid development, the conventional critical
infrastructure is gradually exposed to the public such that part of the systems especially
the distribution networks involving smart metering communications along with controls of
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distributed generation and demand responses at consumption sites will potentially pose a
number of security risks. Recently, several surveys and tutorials have elaborately addressed
a number of security issues in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA),
from passive attacks to active attacks [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89], such
as eavesdropping, jamming, tampering, spoofing, altering, and other attacks against the
protocol stacks of the OSI model; these attacks are foreseen inevitable and nontrivial
within the context of the cyber-physical smart grid. Among which some literatures have
emphasized the interrelationship between cyber and physical securities [90, 82, 80]. For
example, there are two primary research directions in smart grid security. 1) A breach
of network availability: a power system involves real-time models that perform state
estimation to observe the current state conditions in the power network by obtaining
real-time measurement data from network meters and devices. Without these data, state
estimation cannot be effectively executed in real time, thus resulting in the incapability
of decision making for network operators. If the network communications is intruded by
denial of service (DoS) attacks or other schemes against data availability, the services will
be interrupted in both communications and power systems. 2) A breach of measurement
data confidentiality and integrity: due to the cause-effect attribute, if measurement data are
further altered by intruders in a way that the attack is hard to be detected, not to mention
customer privacy is invaded, but the undetectability will cause utilities to lose revenues
and result in severe power outage and equipment damages.

Countermeasures relied

on cryptographic mechanisms, secure communications architecture and network designs,
device security, and intrusion detection systems (IDS) are anticipated options for securing
the future power system against malicious intrusions and attacks from all perspectives in
a complementary manner, e.g., energy consumption analysis, communications security,
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information theory, and data mining. The implementation of various strategic approaches
will be based on different smart grid applications as well as communications requirements
throughout the networks.
According to the Institute for Electric Efficiency (IEE) [91], one-third of households
in the U.S. have had a smart meter (i.e., approximately 36 million smart meters) as of
May 2012, and approximately 65 million smart meters will have been deployed by 2015.
While the deployments continue to rise, a few energy theft incidents have been discovered
that some illegal customers intended to lower their electricity bills via meter tampering,
bypassing, or other unlawful schemes regardless of traditional or smart meters in places
such as Ireland, Hong Kong, and Virginia U.S. [92]. Notably, energy theft is one dominant
component of non-technical losses, which account for 10%–40% of energy distribution
[93], e.g., $1–6 billion losses due to energy theft yearly for utilities in the U.S. Moreover,
the report [94] has revealed that the current installations of smart meter communications
protocols and associated infrastructure do not have sufficient security controls to protect the
electric power system against false data injection attacks, not to mention older meters which
were not designed to adequately cope with such attacks. In addition to the physical attacks,
network attacks by compromising meters can also introduce malicious measurement data
and cause degradation of grid operation [95, 96]. While some protection schemes against
malicious network traffic have been proposed for smart grid communications networks
monitoring [97, 98, 99], detection mechanisms and analyses for identifying malicious
measurement data and energy theft have been investigated explicitly in [100, 101, 102,
103, 96, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 93, 116].
Power grid is a feedback loop control system that relies on measurement data
obtained from network measurement units such as meters and sensors. Based on the
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available data, the control center executes a series of tasks such as topology processing,
network observability analysis, state estimation, and bad measurement data processing in
order to identify the current status of the power network [117]. Consequently, a number of
decision making on controlling actuators, optimizing power flows, and analyzing possible
contingencies are performed to ensure network stability and security, in accordance with
what the system observes or estimates. In reality, the measurement data may not be always
accurate because of errors in measurements, failures in telemetry and equipment, noises
in communications channels, and possibly breached integrity by intentional intrusion or
attacks. If the accuracy of measurement data is not as precise as it gets, the decision making
can be mistaken in consequence of misguided state estimation.
For simplicity, the common formulation of the state estimation problem is to consider
a DC (direct current) power flow model [117], that is, z = Hx + e, where H is the m × n
Jacobian matrix representing m network equations related to network topology, x is the
n-vector of the true states (unknown), z is the m-vector of measurements (known), and
e is the m-vector of random errors. The state estimate x̂ can be obtained by calculating
G−1 HT Wz, where G = HT WH is the state estimation gain matrix, (.)T is the transpose
of (.), and W is a diagonal matrix whose entities are based on the reciprocals of the
variance of measurement errors, which may represent meter accuracy. In order to detect
bad measurement data affected by the noise vector e and meter accuracy W such that the
residual r = ||z − Hx̂|| > δ (where ||.|| is the L2 -norm and δ is a predetermined threshold),
common techniques such as normalized residuals and hypothesis testing are sufficient to
detect anomalies. Nevertheless, a recent study [96] observed that the traditional detection
is not able to differentiate between natural anomalies and malicious intrusion attributed
to false data injection (FDI) such that zb = z + a and x̂b = x̂ + c, where a = Hc is an
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attack vector injected to the system that is designed to be a linear combination of the
column vectors of H in order to bypass the detection, i.e., ||zb − Hx̂b || = ||z − Hx̂||.
The authors further showed that the attacker is required to compromise a number of meters
(i.e., 30%–70% of meters in IEEE 9, 14, 30, 118, 300 bus test systems) in order to bypass
detection and takes less than 10 seconds. This type of attacks is interchangeably called an
unobservable, undetectable, or stealth attack that needs to be launched in a coordinated
manner [103, 118, 80] with knowledge of the network configuration matrix H while not
violating the physics of power flow. Having knowledge of H by the attacker has been
assumed in most of the current studies. Although a full knowledge of the entire system
gained by the attacker may be improbable, it is worth studying and developing a detection
framework to identify the malicious attack in case of the attacker possibly having acquired
partial knowledge and considerable capability and resource. In fact, the attacker being
able to launch FDI without prior knowledge of H has been studied in [113], that is, if the
network topology remains static and the independent loads vary insignificantly for a period
of time, H can be inferred.
Several works have rigorously investigated the FDI attack by proposing various
detectors or analyzing the damage effects on the power system. For examples, Kosut
et al.

[102] proposed a detection scheme based on generalized likelihood ratio test

while comparing with other two detectors based on the residual error r derived from the
state estimation that uses minimum mean square error technique. The authors studied
the outcomes of maximizing the residual error and minimizing the detection rate for
the attack.

Yuan et al.

[108] identified the attack launched in two different time

periods (i.e., immediate and delayed attack) in which the former may lead the system to
perform unnecessary load shedding whereas the latter may cause power overflows on some
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transmission lines. However, the authors only modeled the immediate attack and showed
that the attack leads to a high economic loss. Lin et al. [107] studied the effectiveness
of the attack in terms of transmission cost and power outage rate by deceiving the amount
of energy request and supply as well as the status of transmission lines by claiming a line
is valid to deliver a certain amount of power while it is not and vice versa. Giani et al.
[103] proposed countermeasures by utilizing known-secure PMUs (phasor measurement
units) placement and illustrated that p + 1 PMUs are enough to detect p k-sparse attacks
for k ≤ 5 while assuming all lines are metered. Qin et al. [106] illustrated a case where
the attack is detected but still unidentifiable in such a way that it is difficult for operators
to know which set of meters are truly compromised. The authors proposed a three-step
search process that firstly identifies the meter with the largest residual (which exceeds a
predetermined threshold) after state estimation, secondly locate a feasible attack region
associated with the meter, and finally check a set of suspicious meters located in the region
by using a brute-force search.

2.4

Summary

Among existing literatures in the smart grid field, most of the works have been studied in
an independent way; they can be categorized into five predominant areas: 1) power-centric
[74, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 51, 73, 54], which focuses on analyzing power management and
champions the addition of communications tools in coordinating various operations of the
future power system in an efficient manner, such as Volt-VAR control, power flow, MG,
and EV management; 2) communications-centric [75, 72, 47, 76, 53], which evaluates
different technologies to support different capacities and data rates and determines how
these technologies should be implemented in different domains in order to cope with
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the required throughput and latency; 3) power-communications-centric [77, 78], which
studies the energy cost affected by communications delay and data loss; 4) energy use
scheduling-centric [36, 38, 35, 37], which develops various efficient algorithms to allocate
households loads throughout the day by using optimization tools to minimize energy cost;
and 5) cyber-physical-security-centric [79, 96, 100, 108, 119, 120, 98, 121, 103, 104, 101,
102, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 93, 116], in which some designed
appropriate cryptographic key management, authentication techniques, as well as security
architecture for the smart grid communications, while others analyzed the state estimation
of power systems associated with FDI attacks and proposed detection schemes.

CHAPTER 3
ALLEVIATION OF PHOTOVOLTAIC SOLAR POWER CONGESTION IN
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS VIA SMART METERING COMMUNICATIONS

3.1

Motivation

Power transmission congestion has been one of the major issues in the centralized power
system network. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 2009 National
Electric Transmission Congestion Study [34], the two most critical congestion areas are
1) mid-state New York and southward along the Atlantic coastal plain to northern Virginia,
and 2) the urban centers of southern California. Power flow in transmission lines often
becomes congested when the network is overloaded due to rising power demand and
power generation, insufficient transmission capacity and transfer capability, peak demands
in urban regions, distant demands in rural regions, and a lack of power transmission
lines. Although many works based on supply management on congestion relief have been
proposed to solve traditional power congestion [29, 28, 30, 33], no works have determined
and analyzed local power congestion attributed to power surplus produced by the local
DERs. In fact, a recent study is reported in the Pacific Northwest [122] indicating that
there is no sufficient transmission capacity to deliver a surplus of wind power from its
region to the other, and thus the wind turbines may be shut down temporarily. Therefore,
it can be foreseen that the prolific deployment of DERs close to end-use sectors may incur
local congestion and deterioration in the distribution grid if power control and management
is not properly engineered.
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This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents a power system model
where congestion due to solar surplus may occur in a neighborhood. It further describes the
operation of a PV solar system and discusses means of disconnecting solar units from the
distribution grid. A framework of smart metering communications for the disconnection
process is proposed. Section 3.3 formulates the congestion problem and analyzes both
dynamic programming and greedy approaches for solving the defined knapsack problem.
Heuristic algorithms are proposed for candidate unit (de)selection. Section 3.4 analyzes the
simulation results of the proposed algorithms and discusses the findings. Finally, Section
3.5 summarizes the focal points and draws a conclusion.

3.2
3.2.1

System Models

Power System Model

In electric power systems, power flow analysis is essential to schedule and plan for the
amount of power flows between two buses1 of the interconnected system. Available
Transfer Capability (ATC) of the transmission network is a measure of the transfer
capability remaining in the physical transmission network for further commercial activity
over and above already committed uses [123]. It has been a tool used for congestion
management as well as for power marketers trading in the competitive electric market
[124, 125]. ATC is computed as
AT C = T T C − T RM − ET C
1A

(3.1)

bus is electrically equivalent to a single point on a circuit, and it marks the location of one of two
things: a generator that injects power, or a load that consumes power; it provides a reference point
for measurements of voltage, current, and power flows [32].
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where TTC (total transfer capability) is the maximum amount of power that can be
transferred over the network in a reliable manner while satisfying all security constraints,
i.e., thermal, voltage, and stability limits; TRM (transmission reliability margin) is the
amount of transmission transfer capability necessary to ensure the network is secure
under a reasonable range of uncertainties2 in system conditions; and ETC (existing
transmission commitments) includes retail customer service and CBM (capacity benefit
margin). CBM is the amount of transmission transfer capability reserved by load serving
entities for generation reliability requirements [123]; it is reserved for emergency when
power generation is insufficient in one area which needs to be supplied with purchased
power from other regions [125]. ATC can be a very dynamic quantity for a specific time
frame for a specific set of conditions. The key parameter ATC is used to assess and mitigate
the solar power surplus congestion problem.
The ATC is presumably calculated and available at the UCC periodically3 . It allows
utilities to determine if the network at specific times is able to accommodate an aggregate
of solar power surpluses. If not possible, a scheduling algorithm is required to disconnect
some of solar units from the grid in order to maintain the system stability.

Figure

3.1 illustrates an example of five households with rooftop solar panels connected to the
distribution line. Each household has its energy profile available that contains data for solar
power generation (G), household power demand (D), and unused power flowing back to the
2 Uncertainties

of transfer capability that may occur during a power transfer are always considered
in determining the ATC [126]; they may involve equipment failures, inaccurate network
parameters, imprecise transfer capability computation, varying loads due to environment and
weather conditions, and power cost change in the electricity market.
3 ATC of power transfers among subnetworks of the entire interconnected transmission network
cannot be evaluated in isolation; regional or wide-area coordination is necessary from all entities
to gather and post sufficient information. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that ATC has to
be calculated in real-time and available in order for network operators to be aware of the network
congestion level.
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Figure 3.1 An example of the systematic model.
grid (S). In this example, each household has a solar surplus except for household 2, which
Inverter

has a surplus value -3
because itDCis consuming more
energy thanToit can produce. Household
AC Breaker
PV Solar
Panel

Disconnect

Panel & AC
Disconnect

Household
Load

2’s demand 10 may be compensated by the existing power (i.e., ETC including CBM in
Equation 3.1), by an aggregate of solar surpluses 12 produced from others, or by partial
existing power and solar surpluses. In either case, power is drawn from the distribution
line and household 2 has to remain on the grid. From the utility perspective, the residual
surplus can be used for commercial trading while satisfying the ATC limit. Since the line
capacity cannot hold the residual surpluses, disconnecting some of the solar units is one
approach to congestion avoidance. A set of feasible solutions of allowing the solar units
to remain connected with the grid include {1,3,5}, {1,4}, {3,4}, and {4,5}, where {.}
represents a set of solar units. Despite the fact that choosing either of the combinations
will not violate the ATC limit, the intention of maintaining as large number of units as
possible in selection can minimize the number of disconnection as well as reconnection.
Communications is required to perform the disconnection process. Efficient monitoring
and congestion management can be provisioned via smart metering communications or
SMC (to be discussed in Section 3.2.2).
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Figure 3.2 The grid-tie solar system mounted on rooftops.
A grid-tie system for the PV solar unit is analyzed rather than an off-grid (standalone)
system. In fact, the grid-tie unit is preferred not only because it has higher energy efficiency,
but also because the off-grid unit requires a bank of batteries or capacitors equipped for
storing power to supply on its own, thus resulting in an extra cost for households [127].
The PV solar array system. A grid-tie solar system mounted on rooftops or
on ground without batteries backup is composed of four major components: PV solar
panels/array, DC Disconnect, inverter, and AC Disconnect/AC breaker panel (ACDBP)
[128]. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, solar power is generated through the semiconductor
cells of PV solar panels as a stream of direct current (DC). The maximum amount of
power that can be produced depends on various factors, such as sun intensity, temperature
condition, and techniques implemented in the inverter, e.g., maximum power point tracking
(MPPT) [129]. The DC power generated from the solar panels flows to the DC Disconnect
(switch/breaker box). The DC flow can be prevented from entering the DC Disconnect
during emergency or maintenance on the utility grid system. In a normal situation,
the grid-tie inverter transforms the DC power collected from the DC Disconnect into
alternating current (AC) power for most of residential and commercial uses. It produces
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power that meets the requirements of the utility grid so that the generated power is
synchronized with the grid power before flowing into the grid. The ACDBP can also stop
the current flow from entering the grid for emergency or maintenance purposes. Without
the AC Disconnect, the consumer’s load is also interrupted while the solar power is isolated
from the grid [130].
There are essentially two ways to prevent the generated solar power from entering
the grid: 1) Open the circuit between the solar panels and DC Disconnect, and 2) Open
the circuit between the ACDBP and the grid. The former entirely isolates the generated
power from the solar panels. The generated power may be grounded—this results in the
lowest efficiency of energy use because households are unable to consume the energy.
On the contrary, the latter allows households to consume their solar power from the AC
breaker panel through another dedicated line4 . Hence, this method is preferred despite the
excess power is also sent into the ground while unused. Once energy consumption rises
and approaches the amount the solar panels generate, the ACDBP is reconnected to the
grid granted by the utility operator and the grid power can be provisioned; therefore, the
second case is considered.
Congestion and overload–Causes and Remedies. Unexpected power demand and
renewable energy production can potentially instigate congestion in both transmission
and distribution grids. From a consumer perspective, variation and surge in loads are
essentially attributed to consumers’ needs and activities as well as environment and weather
conditions. The former is usually unpredictable where historical data of consumption are
required to estimate the prospective loads in advance. The latter is supervised with the
4 The

smart meter stops measuring the solar power generation because the line between the smart
meter and the ACDBP is disconnected.
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aid of weather forecast to match the correlated loads in specific regions and seasons. On
the other hand, determination of transfer capability such as TTC and ATC (described in
Section 3.2.1) in the interconnected grid is critical from a network perspective. Foreseeing
the approximate amount of consumption without sufficient transfer capability calls for
proper actions to avoid congestion. Therefore, demand response programs are applied
to manipulate varying consumption such that consumers have a choice whether or not
to consume energy based on the corresponding price signal received from utilities. The
demand side management adopts peak shaving and valley filling strategies to reduce
demand peak-to-average ratio, and at the same time to increase energy utilization.
Furthermore, solar power surpluses during renewable times can also overload the
network when consumption is low and when the resources are limited, e.g., lack of energy
storage, transfer capability, and transmission capacity. Several ways to tackle the issue may
include
• Sell excess power to other regions in need or maximize energy use during renewables
production. However, utilities may run out of capability to sell the surpluses when
consumption is low or people not being home.
• Shut down some power plants such as fuel oil, natural gas, or even nuclear.
Nevertheless, this may put the grid in danger due to the intermittency and variability
of renewables generation. In addition, some generators cannot be turned back on
within a short period of time.
• Store surplus energy in additional storage as much as possible for later use.
Nonetheless, current energy storage is still expensive and inefficient.
• Disconnect a number of solar units from the grid.
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Figure 3.3 Communications in HAN between smart meter and EMU as well as between
EMU and solar unit, appliances, and thermostat.
3.2.2

Communications System Model: SOlar UNit Disconnection (SOUND)

Communications in the legacy electric power system has been partially proprietary and
based on simple protocols. In fact, no communications or simple communications is
preferred in fault detection management [24]; shutdown is the quickest and safest way
in the protection system. In order to enhance the network visibility for utility operators,
integrating ICT and smart grid technologies is necessary to achieve effective distributed
control and monitoring. There are various choices of communications technologies for
NAN and HAN. Implementation of wireless technologies either based on IEEE 802.11
WiFi [131] or IEEE 802.15.4g for NAN and IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee [132] for HAN as part
of SMC in the AMI is proposed. IEEE 802.11 supports high data rate to relay an aggregate
of data collected from smart meters to the UCC. IEEE 802.15.4 provides reasonable data
rates for small-size data packets with low power transmission, whereas IEEE 802.15.4g
(smart grid utility network) tailors sub-GHz frequency bands for better RF penetration and
less interference. The HAN design referred in Reference [35] equips each house with
an EMU. In the proposed scheme (as shown in Figure 3.3), the PV solar unit, household
appliances, thermostat, and ACDBP, are physically connected with the smart meter. The
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smart meter has multiple built-in functionalities supporting different wireline and wireless
communications protocols of powerline communications (PLC) and RF technologies [133].
The EMU plays as an intermediate node (e.g., gateway) which coordinates households
energy consumption and records solar generation. It also consults with the smart meter to
determine if low energy cost can be obtained when grid power is needed. The smart meter
also measures and records both solar power generation/surplus and households energy
consumption. The measured data at the smart meter are transmitted to UCC via SMC.
In Figure 3.4, SMC in NAN consists of smart meters, relay/aggregation nodes, and an
UCC.
SMC is constructed as a wireless mesh network. Figure 3.4 illustrates the case where
a neighborhood is composed of twelve households and three relay nodes. Data packets
containing energy profiles are periodically transmitted in uplink from the smart meters,
through relay nodes, and received at the UCC. Upon data reception, the UCC performs
computation based on the proposed algorithms (to be discussed in Section 3.3) and sends

38
the notification packets back to the smart meters if their solar units need to be disconnected
from the grid. For example, if the UCC determines that no power congestion is found in the
network, no action is taken at the UCC. When unit disconnection is required, each smart
meter associated with its corresponding solar unit to be disconnected receives notification
from the UCC5 , and sends a signal to ACDBP to disconnect its solar unit from the grid.
Consequently, the smart meter stops transmitting data to the UCC6 . Since the disconnection
would not affect household consumption from the solar generation (as discussed on p. 33)
for a period of time, data transmission between the smart meter and UCC is not required7 .
Once consumption arises or generation decreases and EMU is aware that grid power
is needed while communicating with appliances and solar units, EMU notifies the smart
meter of the event. The smart meter starts transmitting a request packet to the UCC
to see whether reconnection can be done. The UCC replies with a price signal. If the
household agrees to consume the grid power based on the time-of-use (TOU) price, the
reconnection is granted. Otherwise, disconnection remains until congestion is relieved. For
households which remain connected, the corresponding smart meters periodically transmit
data information to the UCC. The mechanism of the proposed system model is summarized
in Algorithm 1.
5 In

the proposed mechanism, the number of disconnected units is minimized so that the number of
notification packets in downlink is kept as small as possible.
6 At the same time, the number of data packets in uplink is minimized while households are
disconnected from the power grid.
7 Disconnection makes the households equivalently operate in the islanded mode. Power is selfprovisioned, and therefore no data transmission is necessary from the disconnected smart meters
during the disconnection period.
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3.3

Problem Definition and Formulation

N households which have PV solar units installed on rooftops or on ground in a
neighborhood are considered. Each household is denoted by n, n = 1, 2, ..., N ∈ N ,
and the corresponding PV solar unit is denoted as xn .
Algorithm 1 SOlar UNit Disconnection (SOUND) Process via SMC
Require: All units are connected to the grid.
Ensure: Periodic data transmission from smart meters to UCC.
1: while power congestion is discovered do
2:

if a unit has no surplus then

3:

Remain on the grid.

4:

else[a surplus exits]

5:

Disconnection is considered (to be discussed in Sec. 3.3)

6:

UCC signals units to be disconnected.

7:

The disconnected units stop transmitting data to UCC and stay in islanded and
standby modes.

8:

Reconnection is granted from UCC when grid power is needed or congestion
is removed.

9:

end if

10: end while

Household n may (not) consume energy in Watt per hour (Wh) during solar power
generation; the corresponding demand value is represented by a nonnegative integer and
denoted by PD,n ∈ N. There is (not) power surplus from unit xn when the generated
power in Wh is more (less) than it is needed; the corresponding surplus value is an integer
b = N \M households are
and denoted by PS,n ∈ Z. In the selection process, only N
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considered where |M| ≤ |N | and households denoted by m, m = 1, 2, ..., M ∈ M, do not
have surpluses (i.e., PS,m∈M ≤ 0) and have to remain on the grid. Finally, the capacity of
the distribution line is a nonnegative integer and denoted by PAT C ∈ N.

3.3.1

Assumptions

Without loss of generality, a list of primary assumptions are considered:
• Sunlight is available most of the time during PV solar power production.
• Variability of demands and surpluses is managed and controlled through EMU and
smart meters in HAN.
• All solar units are grid-tie systems and no additional energy storage is available for
households.
• Households may continue to consume solar energy while solar units are disconnected
from the grid.
• The disconnection at the AC Disconnect can be done by the smart meter via
communications.
• Power loss and system constraints (e.g., real and reactive power8 in terms of voltage,
frequency, and phase) are not considered.

3.3.2

Formulation of Knapsack Problem for Power Surplus Congestion

The solar power congestion issue in the distribution grid can be tackled as one type of
knapsack problems. In the scenario, the solar units either remain connected on the grid or
are disconnected from the grid; a 0/1 knapsack problem where xn = 0 if unit n is scheduled
8 Active

power is the actual power consumed by customers in addition to power losses consumed in
heating the wires and other electrical equipment; it is usually measured in kilowatts (kW). Reactive
power is the power compensated by the generation source to energize certain portions of the AC
power system when there is a time shift in voltage and current; it is measured in volt-ampere reactive
(VAR).
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to be off the grid and xn = 1 to be on the grid is considered. Therefore, the total number
of connected units is calculated as
P

U=

xn , xn ∈ {0, 1}

(3.2)

b
n∈N

It is a binary (decision) integer programming problem. The objective is to maximize the
number of connected units (equivalently to minimize the number of disconnected units)
subject to a limited capacity that the network can accommodate the surpluses of connected
units:
max U
s.t.

(3.3)

P

PS,n · xn ≤ PAT C , xn ∈ {0, 1}

b
n∈N

From a power standpoint, maintaining a large number of connected units allows more
households not only to use their solar power, but also to be able to sell the power surplus
to the utility. From a communications perspective, data traffic congestion may be reduced
owing to fewer packets sent out from the UCC for the disconnection process.
Meanwhile, maximizing the total power demand value is desired while satisfying the
capacity requirement:
max

P

s.t.

P

b
n∈N

PD,n · xn

(3.4)

PS,n · xn ≤ PAT C , xn ∈ {0, 1}

b
n∈N

The strategy is to protect households with high energy efficiency from being disconnected.
The efficiency of energy use of household n, ηn , is a nonnegative real number, and defined
as the ratio of power demand to power surplus. Similarly, the global energy efficiency (η)
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is the ratio of cumulative power demands to cumulative power surpluses, i.e.,
ηn =
η=

PD,n
PS,n

∈ R|ηn ≥ 0

P
P
P D,n
PS,n

(3.5)

b
∈ R|η ≥ 0, n ∈ N

Taking energy efficiency into account will encourage the households with lower efficiency
of energy use to utilize energy during solar power generation. Consequently, the ultimate
goal of having less power surpluses flowed to the grid and more units connected to the grid
can be achieved.

3.3.3

Solutions for the Typical Knapsack Problem

SMC involves enormous data transmission between the UCC and smart meters for various
purposes, e.g., meter data collection, device control, and fault detection. The efficiency of
computation at the UCC is critical to the system performance. When the UCC receives
b
energy profiles from the smart meters, it has to quickly figure out which households in N
should be disconnected from the grid once power congestion is detected. The number of
households covered by a utility company can be as large as from thousands to hundreds
of thousands. Using the brute-force approach to solving a knapsack problem would take
O (2n ) exponential time to obtain the result; the computation running time tends to escalate
exponentially when the number of nodes increases. Since scalability is a main concern for
both computation and communications, the network has to be divided into subnetworks to
form a number of clusters; a decentralized scheme would allow the UCC to manage and
control data computation and data traffic more effectively.
The knapsack problem has been proven a NP-complete problem [134]. Existing
solutions to solve knapsack problems include dynamic programming, backtracking, branch
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and bound, and greedy approaches. Greedy algorithms are proposed to obtain a suboptimal
solution that is good enough to avoid power congestion.
Dynamic programming. Considering adopting the dynamic programming method
for solving the formulated knapsack problem: dynamic programming decomposes a
knapsack problem problem into a number of local subproblems and computes optimal
solutions of the subproblems to obtain a global optimal solution. Instead of finding
all 2n possible solutions exhaustively, dynamic programming looks at smaller capacities
c ≤ C (from 1 to C) and determines which unit n (from 1 to N ) can be included subject
to the subcapacity limit while achieving the maximum demand value at each iteration.
Therefore, dynamic programming requires a table (where the approach trades space for
time) to memoize the subsolutions. By looking up the table in a bottom-up manner, a
global optimal solution can be obtained. The algorithm fills (N + 1)(C + 1) entries in the
table. Each entry requires 1 execution and N executions are needed to trace the solution.
The overall complexity is asymptotically reduced to O (N C) [134], which is solvable in a
polynomial time. Unfortunately, DP becomes prohibitive when the capacity C is too large,
e.g., > 104 in the power congestion problem. One way to reduce the size of the table is
to find the greatest common divisor (GCD) among the surplus values and capacity, but the
GCD usually equals 1 from a large set of values.
Greedy strategy. Typically, a greedy algorithm can solve the knapsack problem
in approximately O (n) running time [134]. One greedy approach to solve the knapsack
problem is to construct permutations by ordering the energy profiles collected at the UCC.
Selecting the candidates among households can be based on the following three methods:
the highest power demand first, the greatest power efficiency first, and the lowest power
surplus first. The three strategies are described as follows:
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1. Nonincreasing power demand (NID): NID tends to maximize the total value of
power demand disregarding the associated power surplus by adding demand values
in descending order:
b
PD,1 ≥ PD,2 ≥ . . . ≥ PD,n , n ∈ N
For this reason, NID is likely to reach the capacity limit quickly. It has the worst
performance in cumulative demands and U as compared to other schemes.
2. Nonincreasing power efficiency (NIE): NIE aims to improve the NID scheme by
considering surplus values as a complementary factor to balance the output of the
system performance. NIE executes Equation 3.5 and accumulates the demand values
in descending order of energy efficiency:
b
η1 ≥ η2 . . . ≥ ηn , n ∈ N
Although a high power efficiency indicates efficient energy use, different
combinations of demand and surplus values can have the same or similar ratios which
are hard to differentiate; this is the key factor that prevents NIE from obtaining a large
U . Overall, NIE achieves the highest total demand value among the three at the cost
of a reduced U .
3. Nondecreasing power surplus (NDS): NDS tends to pick as many units as possible
while it accumulates surplus values in ascending order:
b
PS,1 ≤ PS,2 . . . ≤ PS,n , n ∈ N
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Therefore, the method achieves the largest U as compared to others. However, NDS
disregards the corresponding demand values as opposed to NID.

3.3.4

Heuristic Selection Algorithms for Disconnecting Candidate Units: MNDS and
RVS

While introducing the ordering strategy for unit selection, two algorithms which adopt
the NDS scheme to fulfill the first optimization problem are proposed, i.e., Equation 3.3.
Note that it is reasonable to select a unit beginning with the smallest surplus because its
energy efficiency is likely high; however, in the case where a unit with a small surplus
is due to a small amount of generation, its energy efficiency can be low if the demand is
small. Moreover, units which have small surpluses connected to the grid are kept in order to
avoid frequent disconnection and reconnection. This is because the corresponding demands
can fluctuate such that surpluses may no longer exist and yet the grid power is required.
Therefore, for the first proposed scheme, NDS is combined with NIE to enhance the overall
energy efficiency and demand, i.e., Equation 3.4. For the second proposed scheme, NDS is
applied backwards with NIE to get rid of units (to be disconnected) which do not meet the
design criteria. Meanwhile, the capacity constraint must hold.
Modified NDS (MNDS). Methodology – Data information about solar power
demands and surpluses of N households are assumed to have been collected from the
b are considered when other units
smart meters and available at the UCC. Only units in N
c do not have surpluses available. No units are disconnected while the network is not
in M
overloaded. The overload status of the network is discovered by subtracting the capacity
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b.
limit by the total surplus of units in N
PO =

X

(3.6)

PS,n − PAT C

b
n∈N

When overload is detected (i.e., PO > 0), the NDS scheme is performed (see Line 4-6 in
Algorithm 2). Units are selected based on their surpluses in ascending order. After some
iterations, the algorithm will stop at iteration i when an overload of the capacity is found,
i.e.,
s−1
P

PS,n ≤ PAT C and

n=1

s
P

b
PS,n > PAT C , n ∈ N

n=1

where PS,s is defined as the split surplus value and cannot be added because the capacity
constraint will be violated. Unit s (= i) is assigned as the split unit, which constitutes the
b,
solution vector b
x with x
bn = 1 for n = 1, 2, . . . , s − 1 and x
bn = 0 for n = s, s + 1, . . . , N
i.e.,

b
x= x
b1 x
b2
= [1
|


...

x
bs−1 x
bs x
bs+1

1 ...
{z
b
xl

1
}

0
|

...

0

...
{z
b
xr

x
bNb

0 ]
}

(3.7)

Unlike the original NDS scheme, MNDS tries to further improve the overall energy
efficiency from what NDS can achieve while maintaining U , i.e., s − 1 units. In order
to do this, the overflowed power PE is determined by adding the split surplus value:
PE =

s
P

b
PS,n − PAT C , n ∈ N

(3.8)

n=1

With the knowledge of PE , which is incorporated into the two conditions (Lines 9 and 12)
specified in Algorithm 2, the number of candidate units in b
xl and b
xr (see Equation 3.7) is
determined for an one-to-one substitution.
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Algorithm 2 Modified NDS (MNDS)
1: if capacity is not overloaded PO ≤ 0 then
2:

b is disconnected
No household/unit x
bn ∈ N

3: else
4:

b do
for ∀b
xn ∈ N
Perform NDS algorithm to keep the first s − 1 units ON where s ≥ 2

5:
6:

end for

7:

Calculate PE by adding the surplus of unit s, PS,s

8:

for units in b
xl do
if PE ≤ PS,j , j = (1, 2, .., s − 1) then

9:
10:

Select unit x
bl with min{ηj , ηj+1 , ..., ηs−1 }, ηl , to be the candidate

11:

for units in b
xr do
b ) then
if PS,k − PS,s > PS,l − PE , k = (s, s + 1, ..., N

12:
13:

Select unit x
br with max{ηs , ηs+1 , ..., ηk−1 }, ηr , to be the candidate

14:

if ηl < ηr then
Unit x
bl is substituted by unit x
br

15:
16:

end if

17:

Break
end if

18:
19:

end for

20:

Break
end if

21:
22:

end for

23: end if

. Nothing changed otherwise
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Figure 3.5 An illustration of the MNDS algorithm: Two situations during the substitution
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the split surplus value would make the total 41 and result in overload. While knowing P

E

=

8 derived from Equation 3.8, unit 6 whose surplus value is 8 is determined to be the only one
candidate in b
xl (Line 10). Subsequently, the outcome of searching for candidates in b
xr is
unit 7 only (Line 13). As a result, unit 6 is removed from the list and unit 7 which has higher
energy efficiency is added without exceeding the capacity limit, i.e.,

P5

n=1

PS,n + PS,7 =

33 ≤ PAT C .
In another situation where more than one units found in b
xl and b
xr , assuming PAT C =
38 is shown in Figure 3.5(b). The split unit is unit 7 again and PE = 3 is derived, implying
that any surplus values larger than or equal to 3 in b
xl are qualified for substitution, i.e., units
2-6 (line 9). While unit 3 whose surplus value is 5 happens to have the lowest efficiency
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value among others, an intention to find the units in b
xr that satisfy the requirement (line
12) takes place by subtracting PE by PS,3 (i.e., 5-3=2) and by subtracting PS,7 by PS,9 (i.e.,
12-9=3). The outcome shows the candidates in b
xr to be unit 7 and unit 8.
As a result, unit 3 is substituted by unit 8 whose energy efficiency is higher than that
of unit 7 and unit 3, without exceeding the capacity limit, i.e.,

P2

n=1

PS,n +

P6

n=4

PS,n +

PS,8 = 37 ≤ PAT C . While the one-to-one substitution can preserve as many units as NDS
can, MNDS outperforms NDS in greater energy efficiency once an available substitute is
found.
Complexity – The MNDS scheme inherits the property of the sorting algorithm
(Line 5) which approximately takes n log(n) executions in the average and worst cases.
Accumulating surplus values and calculating PE may take n executions. The main
feature of MNDS is searching for candidates in both b
xl and b
xr that can take n executions,
respectively. Comparing the final candidate in b
xl with the final candidate in b
xr requires 2
executions (Lines 14-15). Therefore, the overall complexity of MNDS is asymptotically
reduced to O(n log(n)).
ReVerse Selection (RVS). Methodology – A reverse method is further proposed to
deselect units to be disconnected from the grid instead of selecting units to be connected
in the previous methods. The RVS scheme is preferred when the number of disconnected
b /2. In order to do this, the energy profiles are sorted in descending order
units is less than N
of surplus values from left to right, as shown in Figure 3.6. The RVS scheme deselects units
with lower energy efficiencies among others according to the requirements constituted in
Algorithm 3, where two conditions are considered: iterations prior to the last iteration (Line
15), and the last iteration (Lines 7, 11, 13).
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Figure 3.6 An illustration of the RVS algorithm: Four situations during the deselection
process are shown, where (a) depicts the first five units being compared during the first
j − 1 iterations, while (b), (c), and (d) demonstrate the last iteration j being performed,
(b) depicts a comparison among the first six units, (c) depicts the first unit being deselected
when it is the only one that satisfies the condition, and (d) depicts a comparison among the
last five units.
Similarly, data information about demands and surpluses are assumed to have been
received at the UCC. An overloaded network is identified by executing Equation 3.6. If
overload is observed (i.e., PO > 0), the deselection process begins. The permutation is
constructed by sorting the surplus values of units in descending order that is contrary to
NDS and MNDS. When multiple iterations are required to deselect units during the process
(i.e., when the updated overload value is larger than the greatest surplus value), an arbitrary
number κ of units are inspected from the first unit and the unit that has the lowest energy
b ) is an adjustable number and is
efficiency is selected (Line 15). The parameter κ (≤ N
defined as the inspection range in the RVS scheme. Considering PO = 280 shown in Figure
3.6(a), one iteration of deselecting a unit is not enough to fulfill the capacity constraint. In
this situation, the first five surplus values of units are compared and unit 2 is deselected in
order to maintain a high energy efficiency.
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Algorithm 3 ReVerse Selection (RVS)
1: if capacity is not overloaded PO ≤ 0 then
2:

b is deselected from the list
No household/unit x
bn ∈ N

3: else
4:

b in descending order and pick κ
Sort PS,n , ∀n ∈ N

5:

b do
for ∀b
xn ∈ N
if PO < PS,n where unit x
bn has the smallest surplus then

6:

Deselect unit x
bi with min{ηn−κ+1 , ηn−κ+2 , ..., ηn }, ηi , from the list (see

7:

Fig. 3.6(d)), and Break
else

8:

if PO ≤ PS,1 then

9:

if PO > PS,2 then

10:

Deselect unit x
b1 from the list (see Fig. 3.6(c)), and Break

11:

else[see Fig. 3.6(b)]

12:

Deselect unit x
bp with min{η1 , η2 , ..., ηi−1 } such that PO > PS,i , ηp ,

13:

from the list, and Break
end if

14:

else[Next round is required; see Fig. 3.6(a)]

15:

Deselect unit x
bk with min{η1 , η2 , ..., ηκ }, ηk , from the list

16:

end if

17:

end if

18:
19:

end for

20: end if
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Notably, picking a large κ may increase the overall energy efficiency and demand
at the cost of a smaller U as compared to NDS and MNDS; the outcome of RVS would
approach that of NIE. Also note that when κ = 0, the outcome of RVS would be identical
to that of NDS in reverse. The recursion continues until the residual overload at iteration
j is found either larger than or smaller than the surplus value of the last unit, i.e., unit
b − j + 1. Both cases indicate one more unit to be deselected.
N
In the former case (Lines 9-14), the overload value is compared with the surpluses
starting from the first unit until it is found greater than the ith surplus. Since the first i − 1
surpluses are larger than the overload value, one of them with the least energy efficiency
is chosen for disconnection. For examples, assuming PO = 11 as shown in Figure 3.6(b),
those before unit 7 (i.e., units 1-6) will require a comparison of their energy efficiencies.
As a result, unit 5 is deselected. Furthermore, Figure 3.6(c) shows a particular situation
where PO = 17; unit 1 with surplus value being larger than the overload value is directly
deselected without a comparison. On the other hand, the latter case (Lines 6-7) applies the
same method for the recursive iterations such that the last κ units are compared, and one
of them with the minimum energy efficiency is chosen for disconnection. Figure 3.6(d)
considers PO = 1, where unit n − j whose surplus value is 3 is deselected among the last
five units.
Complexity – The RVS algorithm also involves the sorting process which takes
n log(n) executions. Since the complexity of RVS is dominated by the first j − 1 iterations,
the complexity of the last iteration j is neglected. In the worst case, the first j − 1 iterations
can take approximately nκ = n2 executions if κ = n. However, the purpose of RVS is to
enhance the overall efficiency while preserving as large U as possible; κ is chosen small so
that the overall complexity of RVS can still be asymptotically reduced to O(n log(n)).
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3.4

Simulations and Results

The simulations are twofold: the first set is undertaken to demonstrate the viability of
the selection algorithms (NID, NIE, NDS, MNDS, and RVS), whereas the second set is
conducted to examine the upstream data traffic in a SMC network.

3.4.1

Performance of the Selection Algorithms

The first simulation represents a special case assuming that power surplus exists from each
household (i.e., all N units are considered in the selection process; M = 0), whereas the
second simulation shows a general situation in which some households consuming more
b units are taken into account;
power than they produce must remain on the grid, i.e., only N
M > 0. For both simulations, PAT C = 30, 000 and κ = 5 are chosen.
In the first simulation, N = 50 is set for scenarios (a)-(d), (e), (g), and (h), in Table
3.1. Note that both scenarios (e) and (f) are the same (i.e., sharing identical probability
distributions and parameters); hence, scenario (e) with N = 50 and scenario (f) with N =
500 are set to observe the effect of N becoming large. The power demand value (PD ) and
power surplus value (PS ) are generated according to uniform distribution (UD) denoted by
U(min,max) and folded-Gaussian distribution (FGD)9 denoted by FG(µ, σ 2 ). PD and PS
are discrete random variables with probability mass functions (PMFs) fD (PD ; µD , σD ) and
fS (PS ; µS , σS ), respectively. Different parameters are designed in eight scenarios to elicit
how the variations can affect the selection schemes.

9 FGD

is derived from the Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ 2 ) by taking the absolute values of all
negative real numbers and rounding them to the nearest integers. In other words, if X is a discrete
Gaussian random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 , D = |X| is a discrete folded Gaussian
random variable that has a folded Gaussian distribution.
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Figure 3.7 PMFs of demand and surplus corresponding to the scenarios in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 The Outcomes of Algorithms Applied to Different Scenarios in Figure 3.7 Correspondingly
Small

M

D

and

N=50
UD
scheme demand surplus  
NID 182892 29771 6.14 0.96
NIE 188472 29578 6.37 1
NDS 187470 29539 6.35 0.99
MNDS 188141 29580 6.36 0.99
RVS 188533 29770 6.33 0.99
Small

U U
40 0.95
42 1
42 1
42 1
42 1
(a)

D

N=50
UD
scheme demand surplus  
NID 84617 29767 2.84 0.72
NIE 114893 29226 3.93 1
NDS 114405 29160 3.92 0.99
MNDS 114874 29241 3.93 0.99
RVS 114951 29453 3.90 0.99

S D  S
demand
131245
145415
143557
144845
145389

and large

N=50
scheme
NID
NIE
NDS
MNDS
RVS

U
31
36
36
36
36

0.86
1
1
1
1

U
14
25
25
25
25

N=50
U scheme
0.56 NID
1
NIE
1 NDS
1 MNDS
1 RVS

U

U U demand
18 0.72 63426
25 1 102382
25 1 101384
25 1 102292
25 1 102395
(c)

U U demand
12 0.67 72087
17 0.94 86010
18 1 70843
18 1 75548
18 1 79741
(e)

Different PMFs and
N=50
UD
FGD
scheme demand surplus  
NID 42545 29832 1.43 0.82
NIE 51300 29428 1.74 1
NDS 47948 29026 1.65 0.95
MNDS 49360 29310 1.68 0.97
RVS 50426 29494 1.71 0.98
Small

D

and large

FGD
surplus  
29891 2.41 0.83
29615 2.90 1
28752 2.46 0.85
29467 2.56 0.88
29323 2.72 0.94
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24
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U scheme
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1 MNDS
0.95 RVS
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UD
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FGD
U U demand
48 0.73 219744
64 0.97 221650
66 1 205716
66 1 209898
65 0.98 215536
(i)

0.86
1
0.94
0.96
0.97

Small

UD
surplus  
29596 1.58 0.92
29545 1.71 1
29088 1.42 0.83
29530 1.49 0.87
29671 1.55 0.91

and

FGD

D  S

N=500
U scheme
0.54 NID
0.88 NIE
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1 MNDS
1 RVS

D  S

FGD
U U demand
16 0.67 46723
23 0.96 50450
24 1 41187
24 1 44015
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(g)

S

N=100 UD
FGD
scheme demand surplus  
NID 114609 29946 3.83 0.83
NIE 135852 29616 4.59 1
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Figure 3.7 explicitly illustrates various PMFs and Table 3.1 summarizes the outcomes
correspondingly.10 One thousand experiments are run to average the results for each
scenario. In each scenario, different widths of PMFs (determined by σD and σS ) and
(non)overlap between the two PMFs (determined by µD and µS ) are presented. An ideal
situation in which the efficiency of energy use is high for each household (η  1) is mostly
found in Figure 3.7(a), (c), and (d), whereas the opposite (η  1) in Figure 3.7(h). Figure
3.7(e) and (f) consider a full overlap between the two PMFs while others test on partial
overlaps. It can be determined from Table 3.1 when the NDS, MNDS, and RVS schemes
are able to outperform NIE with respect to U . The first observation shows that the NID
scheme has the worst performance in all cases; this is because NID disregards surplus
values in favor of high demand values while accumulating demand values in descending
order. Secondly, the NIE scheme obtains the highest cumulative demand values most of
the time and can achieve as large U as NDS can in some conditions (e.g., Table 3.1(a),
(c), and (h)); however, NIE cannot always achieve a large U due to the nonincreasing
accumulation of energy efficiency, which is directly proportional to demand values, similar
to NID. Examples can be found in Table 3.1(b), (d), (e), (f), and (g); larger σD and σS likely
yield more combinations having the same or similar energy efficiency values.
Furthermore, N = 100 is set in the second simulation where only units with
surpluses are considered for selection. Two scenarios are shown in Figure 3.7(i) and (j)
and Table 3.1(i) and (j), and similar outcomes are also achieved. From the set of these two
simulations, it is observed that a number of conditional factors must be satisfied in order for
the proposed schemes to outperform NIE with respect to U : 1) both σD and σS are large,
10 Note

that in Table 3.1, η is the ratio of the energy efficiency of schemes (NID, NDS, MNDS, RVS)
to that of NIE, and U is the ratio of the total number of connected units achieved in schemes (NID,
NIE, MNDS, RVS) to that in NDS.
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2) σD ≥ σS , 3) σS cannot be too small, 4) there is a partial overlap between fD (PD ) and
fS (PS ), and 5) κ must be small enough.

3.4.2

Analysis of Uplink Data Traffic Loads in the SMC Network

The environment for simulating the SMC network is developed under OPNET Modeler. A
SMC network consisting of one UCC and 50 smart meters randomly placed in a 500 × 500
square meters area are constructed (as shown in Figure 3.8(a)). The IEEE 802.15.4 standard
protocol for its wireless communications infrastructure is adopted; a ZigBee coordinator
(used for UCC) and ZigBee routers (used for smart meters) with full functionalities are
selected in order to form a mesh topology. The frequency band of 2.4GHz is chosen to
support a data rate of up to 250kb/s depending on the distance between the devices up to
100 meters, as described in [132]. In the SMC network (presented in Section 3.2.2), each
smart meter periodically transmits a data packet with its energy profile information to the
UCC. The UCC has no packets to send back to smart meters until notification packets for
disconnection are required. Since most of the data packets are involved in the upstream
of the SMC during the selection process, the many-to-one upstream data traffic is only
considered.
Three scenarios are developed in the simulation: the first scenario represents a default
situation where periodic data transmission from smart meters to UCC always takes place
even if some smart meters are disconnected from the grid; the second scenario assumes 25
smart meters are called to disconnect from the grid (therefore, stop data transmission), and
the disconnected smart meters are assumed dispersed or balanced throughout the topology
(shown in Figure 3.8(b)); the third scenario follows the second scenario except that the
disconnected smart meters are concentrated mostly in one area (shown in Figure 3.8(c)).
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 3.8 The simulated network topology in which the dark circle represents UCC
whereas white/gray circles represent the connected/disconnected smart meters.
For each scenario, acknowledgement for data reception is activated and different sizes for
data packets transmitted from smart meters to the UCC are tested: 500b, 1kb, and 2kb.
Furthermore, each smart meter transmits a data packet to the UCC every 5 seconds and
the simulation time lasts for an hour. A notification of disconnection is taken place at
approximately 1, 200 second. From the simulation results as shown in Figure 3.9, the total
data traffic is reduced by approximately 50% whereas E2E delay is reduced by 4% − 8%;
this is because the proposed algorithm halts the data transmission from the disconnected
smart meters during the disconnection period. Note that the location of disconnected smart
meters based on the selection process may affect the performance of data traffic and E2E
delay. As observed from Figure 3.9, the topology of disconnected smart meters located in
a concentrated region involves more data traffic (due to extra control bits) and larger E2E
delay than that located in a dispersed manner.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, power congestion in the electric power system is investigated. Congestion
can occur in a traditional way due to variability of demands and intermittency of renewable
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Figure 3.9 Involved data traffic (a) and global end-to-end delay (b) between the UCC and
smart meters.
energy when network resources are limited. Similarly, local congestion is foreseen to
exist in the distribution grid when the number of solar units in neighborhoods increases
and when energy consumption is low. The solar surplus congestion in the distribution
grid is formulated as one type of 0/1 knapsack problems and solved by greedy strategies.
The objectives are achieved by maximizing the number of connected units on the grid
as well as improving cumulative demand values subject to the power capacity constraint.
Computation time of the selection algorithms as well as data traffic loads in the smart
metering communications is taken into consideration. Extensive simulations have shown
that the proposed algorithms for disconnecting solar units during the selection process
have achieved the objectives.

The proposed models for (dis/re)connection minimize

computation time at the utility control center.

The upstream data traffic via smart

metering communications and corresponding end-to-end delay are also reduced based
on the simulation results. The proposed schemes benefit utilities in both economic and
technical terms.

CHAPTER 4
DECENTRALIZATION OF CONTROLS AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS IN SMART GRID

4.1

Motivation

Traditional power congestion caused by rising energy generation and consumption (or
loads) in the legacy electric power grid has encouraged utilities to implement DER units
in the MV and LV distribution networks. The method of renewable-based distributed
generation supporting local loads (e.g., households installed with PV solar systems) is
foreseen to reduce power losses and improve reliability. Surpluses of power produced by
DER units can be shared among households and delivered to the neighboring distribution
networks [50, 49]. However, the power sharing incurs bidirectional flows in addition to the
fact that the existing distribution networks were not designed to operate with bidirectional
power flow. Several works to use loop techniques [69], power router interface [45], and
inductive power transfer (IPT) technology [71] have been investigated to tackle flow of
power, but none of them specified communications explicitly. The balance of power (i.e.,
power generation and loads to be balanced) which is one of the primary issues in the power
system has been focused from centralized operations to decentralized coordination that
emphasizes a desire for distribution automation in active control and management.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a typical power
distribution system model for the investigation into the power network operation, and
presents the development of an overlay communications network infrastructure for the
active distribution network. Section 4.3 formulates the power balance problem and adopts
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the graph theory tool1 for solving the associated power flow issue in a residential network.
Section 4.4 analyzes the simulation results of the proposed methodology and discusses the
findings. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the focal points and draws a conclusion.

4.2
4.2.1

System Models

Autonomous Distribution Network (ADN)

A distribution network model (a modified model of [54]) is considered to investigate the
operation of a power system, as shown in Figure 4.1. The model consists of one power
source (which can be a group of conventional power plants) in the macro grid, four
distribution networks, and nine buses (i.e., Bus 1-6, 8, 10, 14, depicted by the thick lines).
Note that only the distribution network connected to Bus 4 is shown while other networks
(which are connected to Bus 1-3) also possess the same structure properties for simplicity.
The typical distribution network is composed of eight neighborhoods (i.e., Block 7, 9, 11-13
,15-17), and each neighborhood which is constructed with fifteen households forms a MG.
Traditionally, power is generated by fuel-based power plants in remote locations,
routed or switched through the HV transmission system, and delivered to the residential
sites in the distribution network; power flow is unidirectional. With customers’ capability to
install DER units on their premises, contributing power back to the grid incurs bidirectional
power flow in the power system. Each MG is a grid entity that sometimes can provide
or absorb a range of real and reactive power to or from other MGs, before requesting
1 Graph

theory has been an useful tool applied in various fields such as computer science (task
scheduling), sociology (social network), chemistry and physics (atoms topology), transportation
(road network), power systems (grid operation), and communications (the Internet).
In
communications networks studies (including sensor networks), it is used to explicitly illustrate the
relations among nodes in terms of communications connectivity. In this chapter, graph theory is
used to analyze the distribution grid and associated power flow management.
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directly connected to households but to the associated residential networks.
Each distribution network is designed as a cluster, {c1 , c2 , . . . , cs } ∈ C, where
s =|C| = 4 for the example shown in Figure 4.2. Cluster ci , i = 1, 2, .., s, is partitioned
into a number of groups, {g1 , g2 , . . . , gk } ∈ c, ∀c ∈ C, where g1 ∩ g2 ∩ . . . ∩ gk = ∅ (i.e.,
groups are not overlapping), and all clusters are assumed to have the same group size k
(= 3). Each group, gi , i = 1, 2, .., k, is composed of multiple MGs, {h1 , h2 , . . . , hj } ∈ g,

15
13

12

14
16

c1

1

h1

8

h2

12

h3

13

ADN 3

2

3
4

h2
9

14
h1

16
h2

ADN 2

g2

6

7

c3

c4

5

g1

1

3
4

h1

ADN 1

2

c2

63

17

10

11

g1

g2

h3
15
h3
17

g3

ADN 4

g3

(a)

Input

(b)

Output

Figure 4.2 (a) A connected, undirected graph for the distribution system model in Figure
4.1, and (b) contraction of the graph and formation of ADNs.
∀g ∈ c. All groups are assumed to have the same MG size j except the third group (i = 3)
which has MG size j − 1; from the given example, MG 7, 12, 13 are merged into Group
g1 ; MG 9, 11, 15 are merged into Group g2 ; and MG 16, 17 are merged into Group g3 .
The grouping method assumes that each distribution transformer in residential networks
is connected to the same number of households; meanwhile, for the network balancing
purpose, the number of MGs in each group is kept the same as much as possible. The
balance of power in the power system can be interpreted as follows:
P =

X

Pc + PGEN + PLOSS ≈ 0

(4.1)

c∈C

where Pc ∈ Z, ∀c ∈ C, is the output power of cluster c, PGEN is the total power
generated in the macro grid and delivered to the clusters, and PLOSS is the total power
loss during power transmission. Since power sharing is possible among MGs [52, 49], it
is also possible among groups as well as among clusters. In this way, renewable energy
production can be utilized whenever it is available through power sharing among entities in
order to minimize the amount of power requested from the macro grid, i.e., PGEN = 0; this
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can be done by effectively controlling the output power Pc as much as possible subject
to PLOSS , which is not considered in this dissertation. The output power of cluster c
is the summation of the output power of groups, Pc =

Pk

i=1

Pgi , ∀c ∈ C; the output

power of each group g is the summation of the output power of MGs, Pg =

Pj

i=1

Phi ,

∀g ∈ c, Pg ∈ Z; the output power of each MG h is the summation of the output power
of households, Ph =

Pn

i=1

Pvi , ∀h ∈ g, Ph , Pv ∈ Z, where {v1 , v2 , . . . , vn } ∈ Vh ,

∀h ∈ g denote the buses connected with associated households in the residential networks.
Note that each MG is assumed to have the same household size n, as mentioned earlier.
Consequently, Figure 4.2a can be coarsened to the graph shown in Figure 4.2b where
each decentralized group governs its voltage control and power flow in its corresponding
cluster. The non-overlapping groups constitute an ADN, which is able to perform power
control management internally and interact with neighboring ADNs externally to sell or
buy renewable power before requesting power from the conventional power pants.

4.2.2

Overlay Communications Network Infrastructure (OCNI)

It is assumed that power nodes with communications interfaces (e.g., smart meters with
PV inverters, circuit breakers, line sensors, convertors, voltage regulators, capacitor banks)
in MGs are strategically deployed in positions so that their connectivity is ensured; relay
nodes are placed to mitigate constraints such as transceivers’ transmit-power level, MAC
(medium access control), and routing issues [56, 135]. The positions of nodes in the system
are fixed, and therefore the OCNI model for the power system is developed practically
based on its underlying power network to facilitate both power flow and communications
traffic management.

CCC

Control

Information
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Figure 4.3 The four-tier communications infrastructure for the ADN.
The OCNI model, illustrated in Figure 4.3, is structured into four tiers (from the
bottom to the top): 1) entire households grouped into a number of MGs at Tier 4, 2) sets of
MGs forming neighborhood/field area networks (N/FANs) such that each MG belongs to a
corresponding control center (CC) at Tier 3, 3) coupled or consolidated MGs managed by
an associated subsystem CC at Tier 2, and 4) overall ADNs at Tier 1 such that each ADN
consisting of a number of subsystems is under control of its distribution control center
(DCC). The CCs at Tier 2 and 3 govern the corresponding networks below them. The
DCCs owned by distribution system operators (DSOs) at Tier 1 monitor and control power
flow for the corresponding ADNs. The central control center (CCC) owned by transmission
system operators (TSOs) in the transmission network is in charge of delivering power
to the distribution system upon ADNs’ requests. Power nodes at Tier 4 are associated
with the CCs at Tier 3 (using WSNs based on IEEE 802.15.4) via one-hop or multi-hop
transmissions; the CCs at Tier 3 are associated with the CCs at Tier 2 using technologies
such as 3G and WiFi; and the CCs at Tier 2 are associated with the DCCs at Tier 1 using
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technologies such as 4G and fiber optics, as well as communications between the DCCs
and CCC using broadband technologies.
The operation of each ADN is to collect voltage profile and associated data
measurements from the power nodes at Tier 4, and deliver this data information through
uplink transmission to the CCs at the upper tiers for the local power flow analysis.
In the downlink, the associated CCs send control signals to the power nodes to adjust
power output in order to optimize the network resources while maintaining the system
reliability. Since the size of data packet generated by the power nodes is relatively small
(e.g., tens to few hundreds of bytes), using aggregation technique can improve bandwidth
utilization at upper tiers. In MGs at Tier 4, fast control of individual power units requires
real-time and detailed information on DERs and loads. Fortunately, the study [12] has
demonstrated that the control complexity can be greatly reduced when using coupled
MGs: 1) a system consisting of many MGs does not need fast communication, and 2)
redispatching power among MGs does not need detailed information on individual power
units for the corresponding communications systems to deliver. Therefore, the hierarchical
OCNI with the grouping technique for ADNs can potentially simplify control complexity
and economize communications bandwidth at the upper tiers; this benefits both power
control and communications management.

4.3

Problem Definition and Formulation

Bidirectional power flow due to renewable power generation contributed from the
residential networks requires an effective mechanism to manage power flow in the
distribution system, in which the system reliability is maintained, and at the same
time instant renewable production is consumed in order to maximize energy utilization.
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Balancing power generation and loads is the fundamental rule to stabilize the power system,
i.e., the quantity of total generation matches that of total loads. Hence, the objective is to
balance Equation 4.1, which is rewritten as P =

P

c∈C

Pc ≈ 0; that is, only balancing the

energy generated by households is focused in the problem while the power loss is assumed
negligible as mentioned earlier. Energy from macro grid is ignored so that renewable
power sharing within MGs, among MGs in a group, among groups, and among ADNs
is prioritized in the bottom-up order, to balance the power distribution system whenever
possible.
Determination of the cumulative output power of an ADN at Tier 1 (shown in Figure
4.3) is first to discover the cumulative output power of MGs at Tier 4, i.e., Ph , ∀h ∈ g.
Given the residential network for every MG as depicted in Figure 4.1, the network topology
can be interpreted by using node representation (shown in Figure 4.4): a connected,
undirected tree graph G = (V, E) with a set of vertices v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ∈ V and a set
of edges E. The vertices represent buses, and edges represent line feeders between two
buses. Each household has a smart meter installed with a grid-tie PV system mounted on
the rooftop. Each PV unit generates a certain amount of power (in kW) during a certain
time period based on sun radiation2 . When the amount of generated power is sufficient to
support its household’s load, there is either a surplus or no surplus to flow into the bus. On
the other hand, when PV generation is insufficient to support its household’s load, power
is drawn from the bus. Hence, each vertex (bus) is injected or extracted with positive or
negative power Pvi ∈ Z, respectively, by household vi . During different time periods,
2 The

stochastic nature of renewable energy production may be tackled by means of historical data
and smart inverters. Meanwhile, it can also be traced by periodic data collection and coordination
via communications; the more frequent the data are collected, the more accurate the status is
obtained, but the more the traffic is generated and conveyed in the network.
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household vi can be a generating or consuming unit; household vi can also be an idle unit
when its generation and load are balanced. Note that power is injected to the bus with
PV generation that is unused by a household; the term generation refers to surplus power
instead of purely total generation. For a connected, tree digraph G, each edge is an ordered
pair (v, w) of vertices.
Definition 1. A forward directed edge, edge (w, v), refers to the forward flow from w to v.
Furthermore, the directed edge, edge (v, w), also refers to the reverse flow of edge (w, v),
e.g., edge (v1 , v2 ) represents a forward flow whereas edge (v2 , v1 ) represents a reverse flow
of edge (v1 , v2 ) as per Figure 4.4.
Definition 2. A graph contains a set of parent vertices w1 , w2 , . . . , wl ∈ W ⊂ V , e.g.,
w(v4 ) = w(v5 ) = w(v6 )= v2 as per Figure 4.4.
Definition 3. The capacity of edge (v, w), cap(v, w), is a mapping, cap : E → N\ {0},
which represents the maximum amount of flows that can pass through edge (v, w) and is a
positive integer.
For a feasible flow f : E → N, the following three types of constraints must be
obeyed [136]:
f (v, w) ≤ cap (v, w) , ∀ (v, w) ∈ E

P
(w,v)∈E

f (w, v) =

P

f (v, w), ∀v ∈ V

(4.2)

(4.3)

(v,w)∈E

f (v, w) ≥ 0, ∀ (v, w) ∈ E

(4.4)
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4.3.1

Assumptions

h1,i , h2,i , , h j ,i  g i , i  1, 2, , k

Without loss of generality, a list of primary assumptions are considered:

g1,i , g 2,i , , g k ,i  ci , i  1, 2, , s

• Renewable energy is sufficient in the distribution network during daylight with high
penetration of PV systems, especially in the summer season and when consumption
is low in some regions.
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• No large energy storage is available; when renewable energy is produced, it needs to
be consumed immediately for high energy utilization.
• No reverse power flows back to the transmission grid.
• Voltage, current, frequency for active and reactive power are managed via
coordination by means of control and communications.
• Distance among households is small enough such that power loss in transmission can
be neglected or tolerated.
• Power flow delivered along the feeders is always under the transfer capacity; power
congestion is not considered in this chapter.

4.3.2

Macro Grid Power and Micro Grid Renewable Power Flows throughout the
ADN: Control Of Power flow dirEction (COPE)

In normal operation, power flows from a higher to a lower voltage level, as in the
conventional passive power network from HV transmission to MV/LV distribution. Similar
to the active distribution network, the variability of PV generation and loads will fluctuate
the voltage profiles of MGs. As an example illustrated in Figure 4.4, some have positive
power (available surplus) injected into the node while others have negative power (loads)
extracted from the node. Note that v0 (which is not shown in Figure 4.4) may refer to node
5, 6, 8, 10, 14. In this example, the cumulative output power is 24 (without considering
power loss) which is realized by collecting the measured data from the power nodes at
the instant via communications; the surplus induced by the cumulative output power at
v1 should be exported to other MGs. However, power may flow in a direction which
is not preferred due to power laws. For instance, one power unit injected into v3 can
compensate for the load at v7 that results in a forward direction. Similar to v2 , output power
2 can compensate for the load at v5 causing another forward direction. Without global
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information on each node, the system resource cannot be efficiently utilized. Therefore,
it is necessary to determine how power should flow so that the utilization of energy is
enhanced and system reliability is ensured; meanwhile, some voltage control algorithms
using reactive power regulation proposed in power engineering research can be used to
support the proposed design, e.g., [49, 50, 52, 53].
In order to control the power flow given graph properties, a bottom-up approach is
proposed to first determine the depth information (denoted by D = (1, 2, . . . , d)) of the
tree and begin with the nodes with the largest depth d, i.e., the leaf nodes. In the right
branch of the given example, v15 has positive power of 2, which should be flowed in a
reverse direction, i.e., from v15 to v13 . The cumulative output power of v13 is a summation
of reverse power from v15 and power generation by the associated household. Similarly, in
the left branch, v14 has negative power of 4 that requires its parent v11 to support its load in
a forward direction, while v11 compensates its residual power of 4 for the load at v8 . The
process is repeated until the cumulative output of v1 is derived. Note that power is balanced
at v5 , and v3 has an aggregate of power 11 flowed in a reverse direction to v1 ; these result in
different outcomes than what was discussed above. The proposed scheme COPE is shown
in Algorithm 4, which is operated in each MG in parallel at Tier 4 as well as applied to
operations at the upper tiers.
Theorem 1. Given a radial tree-like topology G, the proposed bottom-up approach for
calculating the paths of power flow is the shortest path.
Proof. The directed distance from a vertex u to a vertex v in a tree digraph is the length of
the shortest directed walk from u to v. Since the digraph G contains no loops, the power
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flow from each vertex passes through or flows into other vertices at most once. Therefore,
the shortest path is obtained.
Algorithm 4 Control Of Power flow dirEction (COPE)
1: Initiation: Perform breadth-first search or depth-first search to obtain the characteristics
of an undirected graph G.
2: Input: A table containing (V T , DT , W T , PVT ) information is sorted in descending order

of DT , where (.)T is the transpose of (.).
3: Output: A digraph G presenting the direction and amount of power flow, i.e., E and

f (v, w).
4: PW (V [n]) = 0
5: for ∀v ∈ V do
6:

PW (V [i]) ← PV [i] + PW (V [i])

7:

if PV [i] > 0 then

8:

f (V [i] , W (V [i])) = PV [i]

9:

E ← (V [i] , W (V [i]))

10:

end if

11:

if PV [i] < 0 then

12:

f (W (V [i]) , V [i]) = PV [i]

13:

E ← (W (V [i]) , V [i])

14:

. reverse flow

. forward flow

end if

15: end for

The given example shows an unbalanced situation in a MG (Ph > 0); a reduction in
power injection is required by increasing households’ loads, e.g., using heat pump water

c1
c2

DCC

c4

DCC

DCC

Control

CCC

Information
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c3

DCC
Tier 1 (Substations)
Tier 2 (Measuring nodes)

Figure 4.5 The two-tier communications infrastructure for the conventional distribution
network in contrast to Figure 4.3.
heaters to store thermal energy [51]. Conversely, when a MG has greater consumption
than generated solar power (Ph < 0), solutions such as demand response and conservation
programs introduced in smart grid applications can be applied, e.g., raising energy costs
and delaying appliances operations. For market business and utility operation reasons,
importing or exporting renewable power from or to other regions can be done by using
the proposed power sharing scheme in descending order of the tier number throughout the
ADNs.

4.3.3

Uplink and Downlink Data Traffic across the OCNI: Power Control and
Communications (PCC)

The Centralized Scheme. Traditionally, power systems are regulated under a two-tier
hierarchical master-slave architecture, similar to the organization illustrated in Figure 4.5.
System control devices such as remote terminal units (RTUs) located at Tier 2 act as slave
data concentrators and periodically report their measurements (on relays, current, breakers)
via a hard-wired connection to a master RTU along with associated DCC at Tier 1 [68].
According to Little’s Theorem [137], if a total set of RTUs M generate average traffic at a
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rate of λM and an additional set of emerging smart meters V generate average traffic at a
rate of λV , the overall system throughput is derived as L = LM + LV , where LM = λM M
and LV = λV V; the single DCC will be required to upgrade its processing capacity in order
to accommodate the aggregate traffic of the measuring nodes (N =M+V). For example,
if the execution time of an operation for power quantity analysis of the DCC takes tproc
seconds on average, the DCC cannot process more than 1/tproc operations/sec in the long
run, i.e., La ≤1/tproc ; the maximum attainable throughput La is an upper bound determined
by the processing capacity of the DCC that could queue up the unprocessed operations and
cause the system to enter an unsteady state when L>La .
In addition to the processing time tproc , considering other delay factors that compose
the overall end-to-end delay T spent in a data communications network system is also
critical: T =(ttrans +tprop +tproc +tqueu )χ, where ttrans is the transmission delay, tprop is the
propagation delay, tqueu is the queuing delay, and χ is the number of hops in a multi-hop
network environment. Despite the fact that the centralization of legacy operation allows
the DCC to obtain a global knowledge of its corresponding distribution network status
at each certain time period, it can degrade the system performance due to the limitation
of La and the requirement of T being directly proportional to N , as well as single-point
failures. The centralized scheme is essentially delivering fine-grained information from
each individual measuring node to the DCC due to the simplicity of legacy one-way power
delivery architecture.
The Decentralized Approach. In order to relieve the computational complexity and
bandwidth capacity at the DCC, decentralization of power-communications operations in
OCNI is proposed to achieve a number of merits: 1) local processing for quick decision
making: a set of sub-CCs are added in the middle tiers as multi-agent coordinators in
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order to perform local power flow optimization at both LV (e.g., 240/120V at Tier 3) and
MV/LV (e.g., 26/13/4kV at Tier 2) levels to obtain global optimization, 2) end-to-end delay
reduction: the addition of sub-CCs decreases the distances between the power nodes and
operation centers to operate power sharing by cooperatively compensating for power within
and among MGs, 3) traffic load deduction: a) when power balance can be fulfilled at one
tier, transmitting data to upper tiers is not necessary (unless the upper-tier CCs request it
for other purposes), and b) the original amount of data containing detailed information on
the power nodes is not required to be transmitted completely to the upper-tier CCs when
power sharing among MGs and ADNs is activated, and 4) scalable: the network scalability
does not have to depend upon the quantity of power nodes but upon the scale of added
sub-CCs at Tier 3 and Tier 2 from the entire distribution network perspective. In contrast to
the centralized scheme, the multi-tier OCNI for ADNs is designed to mitigate heavy traffic
loads by means of coarse-grained information delivered in the uplink transmission:
αi =

Li (i−1)
,
L(i+1) i

i ∈ {1, 2, 3}

(4.5)

where αi is the abstraction ratio which depends on the operation requirement of the CCs at
Tier i (i.e., 0 < αi ≤ 1); L(i+1) i is the total amount of data received from Tier (i + 1), and
Li (i−1) is the amount of data to be transmitted to the CC at Tier (i − 1). For example, in the
process of power balancing, the CC at Tier 3 will need to acquire L4 3 amount of data from
its associated power nodes in the MG in order to have a local knowledge of the network
status while performing its operation. When the support of power sharing with neighboring
MGs is required (either power import or export), the CC at Tier 3 will contact the associated
CC at Tier 2 by sending correlated information regarding its lower-tier network condition
with its L3 2 amount of data, which is usually smaller than what it received, i.e., L3 2 <
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L4 3 ; this is because the Tier-2 CC does not need to know everything about the network
condition of Tier-3 fully supervised by the Tier-3 CC, and interestingly, it may be possible
for the Tier-3 CC to send only a notification message (even abstract data are not required)
to the Tier-2 CC indicating how much power in total it has to export/import to/from the
other MGs in order to support its power balance. The methodology of PCC is illustrated in
Algorithm 5.
Data traffic loads in both uplink and downlink transmission involved at each tier
of the distribution network are investigated. At a given time period, the uplink traffic
loads performing information collection and downlink traffic loads administering control
processes (which are often broadcasts in nature) are described in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2,
respectively.

4.4

Simulations and Results

Performance of the proposed OCNI design in comparison with that of the traditional system
operation by considering the four cases are investigated, as shown in Table 4.3. In reality,
on the one hand the amount of data traffic in the network can be reduced by the intermediate
aggregation or concentration nodes to improve payload efficiencies for the small packets
generated by the measuring devices; on the other hand, the traffic can also be escalated
by necessary retransmissions due to signal interference and packet collisions especially
in unscalable and crowded network environments. The goals here are to discriminate the
outcomes between the proposed OCNI and the legacy operation, as well as to demonstrate
that the methodology aims to alleviate abundant data transmissions across the distribution
network in the context of smart grid applications.
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Algorithm 5 Power Control and Communications (PCC) in ADNs
Require: All units are connected to the grid (in both power and communications
perspectives).
Ensure: Periodic uplink and downlink data transmission between Tier 4 and Tier 3.
1: while unbalanced power is discovered in a MG do
2:
3:
4:
5:

if solutions provided in Sec. 4.3.2 mitigate the problem then
Power control and data communications remain in Tier 4 and Tier 3.
else[solutions do not effectively work]
Power sharing with other MGs is necessary, and communications with CC at
Tier 2 takes place.

6:

if unbalanced problem is still unsolved then
Power sharing with other groups is necessary, and communications with

7:

DCC at Tier 1 takes place.
if unbalanced problem still remains then

8:

Power sharing with other ADNs is necessary, and communications with

9:

CCC takes place.
Power from macro grid is granted if needed; otherwise, disconnecting

10:

PV systems is required.
end if

11:
12:
13:

end if
end if

14: end while
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Table 4.1
Description
of Presumptive
Traffic Loads
via Uplink
between Adjacent
Tiers adjacent
in OCNI tiers in OCNI.
Tier Index

Amount of Trafﬁc Load
L4

= λ Nh N h ,
∀h ∈ g,
∀g ∈ c, ∀c ∈ C

4 to 3

L3

3 to 2

2

3

= α3

|g| 


j=1


λ Nh N h j +
j

+λMg Mg , ∀g ∈ c, ∀c ∈ C
|c|

L 2 1 = α2
L3 2,k +

2 to 1

k=1

L1

ccc

= α1

|C|


L2

This is where an aggregate of data trafﬁc is collected from Tier-3 CCs and other measuring nodes
Mg in the corresponding group. The Tier-3 CCs will generate abstract data containing sufﬁcient
information on |g| MGs status with α3 and transmit to the corresponding CC at Tier 2.
Similar to the above, an aggregate of data trafﬁc is collected from Tier-2 CCs and other measuring
nodes Mc in the corresponding ADN. The Tier-2 CCs will generate abstract data containing
sufﬁcient information on |c| groups status with α2 and transmit to the corresponding DCC.
Similar to the above, an aggregate of data trafﬁc is collected from Tier-1 DCCs. The Tier-1 DCCs
will generate abstract data containing sufﬁcient information on |C| ADNs status with α1 and transmit
to the CCC.

+λMc Mc , ∀c ∈ C

1

Description
This is where the fundamental power control and communications operations take place while each
MG is governed by its associated Tier-3 CC simultaneously to monitor and control power ﬂow
individually. The number of households |Vh | and other nodes Mh (e.g., sensors along the feeders)
that make the total power nodes Nh = |Vh | + Mh in the corresponding MG are considered; the
expected trafﬁc arrival rate of these nodes is λNh .

1,s

s=1

TABLE II: Description of presumptive trafﬁc loads via downlink transmissions between adjacent tiers in OCNI.
Tier Index

Amount of Trafﬁc Load
L 3 4 = λ 3 4 Nh ,
∀h ∈ g, ∀g ∈ c, ∀c ∈ C
L2 3 = λ2 3 (|g| + Mg ) ,
∀g ∈ c, ∀c ∈ C
L1 2 = λ1 2 (|c| + Mc ) ,
∀c ∈ C

3 to 4
2 to 3
1 to 2
1

Lccc

1

= λccc

1

|C|

Description
The fundamental level requires the CCs of N/FANs to send control messages to all the power nodes in
the corresponding MGs; the expected trafﬁc arrival rate of the CCs is λ3 4 .
Similar to the above, the CCs of subsystems send control messages to all the CCs and other measuring
nodes Mg in the corresponding N/FANs with the expected trafﬁc arrival rate λ2 3 .
Similar to the above, the DCCs of ADNs send control messages to all the CCs and other measuring
nodes Mc in the corresponding subsystems with the expected trafﬁc arrival rate λ1 2 .
Similar to the above, the CCC sends control messages to all the DCCs with the expected trafﬁc arrival
rate λccc 1 .

TABLE III: Data trafﬁc for power balance conveyed in the decentralized (OCNI) and centralized (Cen.) operations.
Case
1
2

OCNI

3
4

Total Amount of Trafﬁc
L4 3 + L3 4
L3 2 + L2 3 + L3 4 |g|
L2 1 + L1 2 + (L2 3 +
+L3 4 |g|) |c|
L1 ccc + Lccc 1 + [L1 2 +
+ (L2 3 + L3 4 |g|) |c|] |C|

Description
Power balance (PB) is possible within MGs.
PB is not possible within MGs, but possible among MGs in N/FANs.
PB is neither possible within MGs nor in N/FANs, but possible among groups in subsystems.
PB is not possible within MGs, N/FANs, subsystems, but possible among ADNs; if not possible
among ADNs, either macro grid power or PV unit disconnection is required.
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4.4.1

Traffic Loads Disseminated between Adjacent Tiers in Accordance with Power
Dynamics

In the simulations, the average data traffic of each power node transmitted in uplink is set
identical, i.e., λNh = λMg = λMc = λV = λM = 160bps; the average control traffic of each
CC responded in downlink is also set identical, i.e., λ3 4 = λ2 3 = λ1 2 = λccc 1 = λcen =
80bps; the number of the measuring nodes Mg and Mc in the corresponding N/FAN and
subsystem are set to 50 and 100, respectively. All the CCs at the same tier are assumed
to apply the same α. Three demonstrations are undertaken to quantitatively analyze
the outcomes of adjusting the abstraction ratios and the number of power nodes in the
MGs while determining the amount of traffic involved at each tier categorized into cases:
1) Nh = 100 and α = 0.2, 0.6, 1 in which all of CCs in the network operate with the
same abstraction ratio, e.g., α3 = α2 = α1 = 0.2 in Figure 4.6a; 2) Nh = 500 and
CCs at different tiers have distinct α values for their operations (Figure 4.6b); and 3)
Nh = 500, 1000, 2000 while α3 = α2 = α1 = 0.6 (Figure 4.6c).
It is discovered that balancing power flow via coordination within each MG in parallel
shown in case 1 generates the least traffic loads, whereas case 4 conveys the most traffic
throughout the network because power balance cannot be achieved at the lower tiers and
requires involvement of CCs at the upper tiers to resolve the problem; meanwhile, the
legacy centralized scheme demands all the data transmission and traffic in order to perform
its power flow management. In Figure 4.6a, if the upper-tier CCs are able to manage
the unbalanced network with much less information (interpreted by smaller α) received
from the lower-tier CCs, much more data traffic can be reduced; conversely, if fine-grained
information (interpreted by α = 1) is desired for the upper-tier CCs to do the job, the
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Figure 4.6 Analysis of data traffic under OCNI and legacy system when (a) coarse-grained
information is applied, (b) abstraction values are varying, (c) quantity of power nodes in a
MG is varying, and (d) both operations are tested throughout the day.
traffic loads considered in case 4 will reach approximately the same amount produced by
the centralized scheme.
More interestingly, applying different α at CCs of different tiers has great impacts on
the amount of traffic loads traversed at the upper tiers. Given the same amount of measuring
nodes and traffic arrival rates in the network, Figure 4.6b shows that the mid-gray line is
greater than the dark-gray line in case 3, but they become opposite in case 4; this is because
the DCC requires most of information its lower-tier CCs have in hand while the CCC only
needs information from the DCCs to a certain degree in the case of α2 = 0.9, α1 = 0.5,
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whereas the dark-gray line depicts the opposite case. It is further noticed that an increase in
the number of power nodes of MGs barely changes the normalized rates of data traffic loads
among the four cases because the aggregate data rate is directly proportional to the number
of nodes, given the fixed traffic arrival rates and abstraction ratios, as illustrated in Figure
4.6c. In summary, the demerits of the decentralized OCNI operation are twofold: 1) CCs
at Tier 3 only have their own local network knowledge while other CCs at upper tiers may
have limited knowledge of the lower-tier network, and 2) OCNI may generate more traffic
than the centralized scheme owing to the negotiation messages exchange among CCs, when
case 4 is taken place (i.e., contacting CCC is required) and the abstraction ratio is 1 (i.e.,
fine-grained information is required, see case 4 in Figure 4.6a). Nevertheless, OCNI is
able to efficiently control the traffic of data loads based on its underlying power operation
from LV to MV/LV levels in terms of network delay, and at the same time the amount of
uplink data traffic will be essentially determined by 1) how often data are collected from
the measuring nodes so that the granularity of content collection is satisfied in order to
maintain the system reliability, 2) the volume of information of the lower-tier CCs required
by the upper-tier operators who are then able to conduct power balancing operations at
their level, and 3) the amount of renewable energy produced and consumed in regard to the
pattern of customers’ energy profiles, as well as the allocation of energy storage.

4.4.2

Overall Traffic Loads Disseminated during Different Time Intervals of the Day

Figure 4.6d demonstrates the amount of data traffic conveyed in the network throughout
the day when Nh = 100 and α = 0.6. While the legacy operation involves all the
data transmission as expected, traffic in OCNI shows a pattern in accordance with energy
profiles. The pattern can be categorized into four phases; for example, in phase 1 (0-6

83
hour), people are asleep and PV units are not generating power, and therefore macro grid
power is needed; in phase 2 (6-10 hour), people get up and go to work at sunrise, and
therefore power sharing among ADNs using solar power may be possible; in phase 3
(10-16 hour), solar power is generated at the maximum while most of people are not at
home, and therefore power balance may be achieved within the MGs; in phase 4 (16-18
hour), more people are coming home from work at sunset and start using appliances (e.g.,
oven, TV, dishwasher) that require macro grid power again, i.e., back to phase 1. To further
decrease the traffic loads towards the CCC, implementing energy storage and other RESs
such as micro wind turbines to support power during the nights is also a feasible solution.
Notably, balancing power generation and loads within the MG has great potentials to
reduce traffic loads transmitted to the upper tiers; however, it may be an unlikely case
due to a small quantity of participating power nodes. Increasing the node quantity in a MG
may ease power balance, but at the same time increases both control and communications
complexities. Both case 2 and case 3 show a more practical phenomenon that is likely to
occur in the future distribution system when renewable power and customer loads can be
balanced.

4.5

Summary

In this chapter, a typical power system model which reflects today’s radial tree-like
topology feature is investigated.

A multi-tier communications infrastructure OCNI

is developed to facilitate active operations of the underlying autonomous distribution
networks. Power balance is one primary issue in the power system that can be more
challenging with higher penetration of distributed energy resources in terms of control and
communications complexities. A micro grid consisting of households with installed PV

84
systems in a residential network is considered. The objective is to enhance the utilization
of renewable energy generated by PV systems without energy storage in the distribution
system. Balancing PV solar generation and household loads within the micro grid is
initially tackled by using the proposed algorithm COPE to derive the shortest paths for
power sharing among households by means of voltage control and communications in
coordination. The proposed autonomous distribution network with the multi-tier overlay
communications infrastructure is constructed such that power sharing and associated
communications are initially performed in each individual micro grid at the lower tier. The
simulation results show that not only the methodology PCC has great potentials to save
considerable bandwidth owing to the reduction of data traffic loads at the upper tiers, but
also power balancing through power sharing at the upper tiers is a more practical condition
due to higher chances of power compensation among micro girds at the cost of greater
involvement of information exchange among subnetworks.

CHAPTER 5
A HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM FOR DISTRIBUTION
NETWORKS IN SMART GRID

5.1

Motivation

In order to launch false data injection (FDI) attacks, most of studies have assumed the
attacker has partial knowledge of H and considerable capability and resource, and yet
believed that a full knowledge of the entire system gained by the attacker should be
improbable.

More reasonably, H can be inferred by the attacker who has no prior

knowledge of H if the network topology remains static and the independent loads vary
insignificantly for a period of time [113].

The studies have rigorously investigated

the FDI attack by proposing various detectors and analyzing the damage effects on the
power system in terms of anomaly determination, power transmission costs, and power
outage rates [102, 103, 107]. Among which it is worth noting that the authors in [103]
discovered that the unobservable attack can be effectively detected by determining the
phase parameters via known-secure PMUs placement in a power system environment.
Nevertheless, most of the existing works have addressed the FDI attack problem at the HV
or MV transmission/distribution level and almost none at the LV distribution/consumption
level where smart meters are deployed. The end-use level has been realized to be the most
vulnerable sector in which the utilities have the least control of and the greatest uncertainty
about the future distribution grid development.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 illustrates the system measurement
model prior to the discussion of the attack problem and proposed detection designs. Section
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5.3 presents the problem formulation, attack model, and countermeasures. Section 5.4
analyzes the simulation results of the proposed detection framework and discusses the
findings. Finally, Section 5.5 summarizes the focal points and draws a conclusion.

5.2

System Measurement Model

AC (alternating current) and DC power flow models are essentially used for studying
state estimation. Nevertheless, the DC power flow model is often assessed due to its
inexpensive computation and simplicity [138]. Moreover, a DC power grid is a foreseeable
approach for the future distribution network [139] because 1) many distributed generators
(e.g., household/neighborhood-based solar power systems) supply DC power, 2) AC
grid-connected inverters are not needed, and 3) overall costs and power losses can be
reduced. The ability to perform state estimation relies on the sufficiency of measurement
data available in a network. In other words, the observability of a network has to be
analyzed before state estimation can be processed.
Definition 4. A network is said to be observable [117] if all flows in the network can
be observed by obtaining information in a set of sufficient measurement data such that
no power flows in the network for which Hx = 0, ∀P ∈ x; otherwise, there is (are)
unobservable state(s) where nonzero power flows exist in the network.
Consider a DC network model that has three state variables as shown in Figure
5.1: to ensure that the power network is balanced, there is at least one state that acts as
a generation or load node, i.e., P1 + P2 + P3 = 0. Figure 5.1a shows an underdetermined
and partially observable case where only state P1 is observable, and one of the states P2 ,
P3 is unobservable, and another dependent state is indeterminate. Figure 5.1b shows an
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Figure 5.1 Observability of a network comprised of generation and load nodes (black
circle), bus node (white circle), lines (representing connectivity), and meters/sensors (gray
rectangle) in three cases: (a) underdetermined and partially observable, (b) observable and
sufficient, and (c) observable but overdetermined.
observable and sufficient case where both states P1 and P2 are observable, and dependent
state P3 can be computed from the network model equation with the other two known
state variables. Figure 5.1c shows that all states P1 , P2 , P3 are observable and form an
overdetermined system, but can be solved as a least-squares problem. This model is used
to study the proposed CONSUMER attack model as well as grid sensor placement for
the distribution network of smart grid in this chapter. Moreover, the characteristics of the
emerging smart grid network are considered as follows:
• Nodes (e.g., smart meters, grid sensors) strategically deployed throughout
distribution grids are static. In other words, grid operators have full knowledge of
network topologies in terms of geographical locations and coordinates.
• Nodes are wire-powered while attached to power lines and taking various
measurements such as voltage, current, frequency, and metering.
• The majority of data traffic generated at the nodes are periodic for real-time
monitoring and control.
• Each measurement data generated at the nodes (representing individual customer
energy consumption and grid line conditions for state estimation) cannot be fused at
aggregation nodes as opposed to traditional sensor network scenarios where data of
sensors tracking their surrounding environmental conditions (e.g., temperature) are
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Figure 5.2 A neighborhood distribution network (a) with loops, and (b) without loops.
aggregated at cluster nodes to generalize the current network status by determining
the correlation of the multiple obtained measurements.

5.3

Problem Definition and Formulation

Most parts of the current distribution networks are characterized by radial tree-like
topologies, which may or may not contain loops or cycles, as shown in Figure 5.2. The
distribution network consists of four components: 1) a root aggregation node (marked by
a big black circle) at which power is generated or delivered from other sources, such as
macro grid or neighboring distribution networks, 2) a grid sensor (GS) node (marked by
a gray rectangle) that constantly measures aggregation power Pagg , corresponding to the
quantity of multiple end loads, 3) a number of electric poles (EPs) or buses (marked by
white circles), l = 1, 2, ..., nEP ∈ NEP , with distribution lines/feeders, transformers and
capacitors (not shown) that construct a distribution grid and supply power to customers,
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and 4) a number of household smart meters (SMs; marked by small black circles),
n = 1, 2, ..., nSM ∈ NSM , that have two-way communications capability of reporting
household energy consumption to the utility control center and receiving associate feedback
messages in real time.
Notably, Figure 5.2a shows a distribution network that has loops found among some
EP nodes, whereas Figure 5.2b depicts a network with no loops representing a spanning
tree. Any spanning tree G(VT , ET ) from its originally connected graph G(V, E) can be
computed by using various algorithms, e.g., Prim’s algorithm [140], where V is a collection
of vertices, E is a collection of edges, and VT = V . In other words, any connected
distribution network G(V, E) can have at least one spanning tree G(VT , ET ) with the fewest
edges among EP nodes1 while the four network properties must be obeyed: 1) the network
connectivity is maintained, 2) the spanning tree starts with the distribution head node, 3)
the EP node cannot be a leaf node, and 4) the SM node must be a leaf node. Under this
condition, the spanning tree topology as illustrated in Figure 5.2b can be discovered, and
therefore considered in the studied model in order for us to determine the minimum number
of grid sensors to be placed on edges such that the network is sufficiently observable (to be
discussed on p. 96).
Power flow is further assumed unidirectional (in a traditional way) such that power
is delivered from the root of the tree to the end leaves. A practical scenario is considered
where utility operators currently have limited knowledge about the real-time conditions of
distribution networks (e.g., the difficulty of exactly knowing how and how much power is
delivered across feeders/lines as well as discovering how and where faults are caused if
1 How

to find such a spanning tree of the cyclic distribution network is beyond the scope of this
chapter.
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erroneous activities are present) in a geographically and temporally fine-grained manner
due to lack of grid sensors along with effective coordinated monitoring. As shown in
Figure 5.2, for a power balance circumstance, the summation of individual loads (of all
leaves) must be equal to the amount of measurement metered at the aggregation GS node.
If the aggregated load value exceeds or lessens the GS measurement for a tolerable amount,
an anomalous activity is detected and alarmed, but somehow may not be identified easily
whether it is caused by natural errors or malicious attacks.

5.3.1

The CONSUMER Attack Model

In the CONSUMER attack model, the FDI model (introduced in [96]) is applied to
construct the studied attack scenario at the smart meter level. The typical distribution
network (shown in Figure 5.2) has its own network topology and configuration matrix
H and a set of true states in x = [P1 , P2 , . . . , PnSM ]T indicating the energy consumption
status of household smart meters. It can be assumed that the accuracy of smart meter (i.e.,
W) is nearly precise and the noise vector e ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is normally distributed so that the
estimate x̂ = [P̂1 , P̂2 , . . . , P̂nSM ]T where P̂1 + P̂2 + · · · + P̂nSM = P̂agg is satisfied.
The attacker is assumed to have (partial) knowledge of H whether it is obtained
illegally or deduced by its own observation. The goal of the attacker is to launch the
CONSUMER attack by injecting attack vector a with c to produce a compromised vector
z̄ = [Pz̄1 , Pz̄2 , . . . , Pz̄nSM ]T 6= 0 in which

P

a = 0 particularly such that there exists load

alterations and the altered linear combination cannot be easily detected by a traditional
bad measurement data detector. The indicator χi is considered for which smart meter
of household i is compromised if χi = 1 and otherwise if χi = 0, that leads to z̄ =
[Pz̄1 χ1 , Pz̄2 χ2 , . . . , Pz̄nSM χnSM ]T . The objective of the attacker is to lower its own energy
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consumption level by raising others’. Owing to constrained resources, the attacker tries to
minimize the number of compromised smart meters while achieving its objective subject to
the inviolability of an aggregated load value. The minimization problem for a CONSUMER
attack is formulated as
min

n
SM
X

χi

i=1

s.t.
n
SM
X

Pz̄i χi = Pagg ,

χi ∈ {0, 1},

∀i ∈ z̄,

(5.1)

i=1

P̃imin ≤ Pz̄i < Pi ,

∃!i ∈ z̄ : is the attacker,
χi = 1,

Pz̄i ≤ P̃imax ,

(5.2)
(5.3)

∀i ∈ z̄\A,

Pi ≥ 0, P̃imin ≥ 0, P̃imax ≥ 0,

i ∈ A,

∀i.

(5.4)

This problem is analogous to the coin change problem, which is NP-hard [141]. Both
problems aim to match a given integer value (equality Constraint 5.1) while minimizing
the number of components (objective function) for the outcome. As opposed to the coin
change problem, the CONSUMER problem considers multiple sets of power value ranges
corresponding to multiple households’ energy profiles with predicted ranges of energy
consumption (inequality Constraints 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4), and that at most one value within
the range belonging to one household is selected and each household is picked at most
once.
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Figure 5.3 The attack region for a one-to-one pair between the attacker and the victim.
Theorem 2. A CONSUMER attack can be launched successfully by compromising as few
as two smart meters (one for the attacker and one for the victim) in any spanning tree which
meets the four aforementioned network properties (p.89).
The proof of the theorem is trivial. Since there is only one grid sensor measuring
an aggregated energy consumption value of the entire distribution loads, a CONSUMER
attack on any two of the households can easily become undetected and hence, unidentified.
For example, Figure 5.3 depicts an attack safe region associated with one attacker and
one victim that is bounded by three major values: Pi∈A which is the current energy
min
consumption value of the attacker, P̃i∈A
which is the minimum predicted consumption
max
value of the attacker in the next time period, and P̃i∈z̄\A
which is the maximum predicted

consumption value of the victim in the next time period. In a one-attacker-one-victim
scenario, the attacker tries to decrease its consumption by increasing the victim’s as much
as to be in a horizontally narrow rectangular zone shown in Figure 5.3. Essentially, under
an unconstrained case, the attacker can pick any arbitrary nonnegative value (Constraint
5.4) and performs subtraction on its consumption amount and addition on the victim’s
to avoid detection as long as Constraint 5.1 is held; the minimization problem will be
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reduced to a simple linear programming problem. On the other hand, under a constrained
min
case, the attacker cannot simply pick any number but needs to determine appropriate P̃i∈A
max
and P̃i∈z̄\A
in order to avoid detection as anomalous activities. In fact, utilities might

implement various kinds of prediction methods to predict and monitor households’ energy
consumption in the future time periods, and that would complicate the problem. Any
anomaly activity that deviates from the correspondingly estimated regression lines beyond a
predetermined threshold will trigger an alarm in the intrusion detection system. Unless the
min
max
cannot be chosen
attacker has prior knowledge of what the thresholds are, P̃i∈A
and P̃i∈z̄\A

too aggressively. Therefore, for the attacker to launch a more sophisticated CONSUMER
attack, Constraints 5.2 and 5.3 (which can be treated as part of countermeasures in the
proposed hybrid detection solution) must be considered carefully. In addition to these
constraints, the costs of compromising smart meters via coordinated communications on
the spatial and temporal scales are also challenges from the attacker perspective.

5.3.2

Countermeasures for the Utility Defender: IDS with POISE and GPS

It is unlikely to have a one-size-fits-all solution for detecting anomalous or malicious
activities in smart grid. A framework that integrates the characteristics of power network
load consumption dynamics, communications network traffic dynamics, and network
observability analysis via grid sensor placement is developed for an evolutionary intrusion
detection system, as shown in Figure 5.4. The last item of the proposed framework
is covered in this chapter, and the first two items are left for the future works. In a
cyber-physical smart grid AMI network, the uplink transmission from smart meters to
control centers as well as downlink transmission in an opposite way is vulnerable to a
breach of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). While a general FDI attack can
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Figure 5.4 POISE: a hybrid intrusion detection system.
be launched on the two way links, the CONSUMER attack is specifically instigated in the
uplink transmission causing utility operators to make wrong decisions in consequence of
receiving falsified measurement data which are hardly distinguishable from the legitimate
ones. There are two fundamentally challenging questions in the context of the smart grid
intrusion detection system design:
1. What is an adequate threshold for defining an anomaly activity, e.g., in the application
of characterizing customers energy consumption behavior while they may be elusive
to some extent? Does it even exist?
2. How to effectively distinguish between (unintentionally) anomaly and (intentionally)
malicious activities?
While these intriguing questions require further research in the next few years, some
insights into the following first two detection methods based on both power and
communications networks dynamics analyses are provided, followed by a grid sensor
placement mechanism proposed to effectively enhance the intrusion detection process.
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Power Network Inspection.

A power grid system obeys a series of control

theories based on laws of physics. Data measurement collection not only involves power
load consumption measurement but also voltage, current, and power factor elements.
Observations on phase differences on the transmission/distribution level studied in [103]
can be further evaluated on the distribution/consumption level. Another useful metric for
designing specification or rule-based anomaly detection systems is to deeply understand
different classes of customer energy consumption patterns at different time scales, e.g.,
usage trends on weekdays, weekends, monthly, seasonal, and annual basis corresponding
to individual activities and weather conditions.

Many approaches for characterizing

household electricity demands including Fourier series, Gaussian processes, neural
networks, fuzzy logic, as well as regression and autoregression have been studied [142].
Meanwhile, the existing scheme of detecting illegal customers based on Support Vector
Machine (SVM) learning and rule-based algorithms has also been investigated in [93].
These methods could be effectively incorporated in the intrusion detection system at the
application level to improve detection accuracy. Furthermore, computational intelligence
[143] can also be readily applied for intrusion detection.
Communications Network Inspection.

In addition to the methods of power

dynamics inspection, extensive studies on traditional low-power WSN attack scenarios
[87] at the physical, MAC, and network layer levels are complementary intrusion detection
tools to be integrated into the smart grid communications security environment, specifically
against the jamming, replay, and DoS attacks. Several dominant metrics such as data
sending rate, receiving rate, packet loss rate, and signal strength will be tailored to
effectively facilitate the detection of anomaly activities in smart grid communications in
response to compromising or breaching circumstances.
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Intrusion Detection System with Power Information and Sensor Placement –
IDS with POISE. Smart meter deployment has been initiated worldwide in the past
few years.

The rationale for replacing the traditional meters with smart meters is

plentiful, but the fundamental one is to be able to monitor and control customer energy
consumption more efficiently in real time through two-way communications by leveraging
the state-of-the-art wire/wireless and power line communications technologies. By gaining
knowledge of individual energy usage patterns, utilities can deal with primary issues easily
such as peak demands alleviation, remote meter reading, and distributed renewable energy
sources accommodation, in order to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas
emission. The entire smart grid AMI network consisting of a number of control centers
and hundreds of thousands of smart meters is likely to operate using the IP Protocol with
IPv6 addresses assignment connected to the Internet [144]. Smart meters support multiple
communications protocols that facilitate smart energy management in HANs and mesh
routing in NAN. Many have considered utilizing the existing networks such as WiFi and
wireless mesh networks to communicate under unlicensed bands for economic reasons.
This strategy creates network uncertainties by exposing security vulnerabilities of smart
metering communications to the public.
In the meantime, grid sensor placement across the distribution network is proposed
in which these grid sensors with simpler functionalities (than smart meters) are owned
by utilities and construct grid sensor networks operating in dedicated or licensed bands
specified in IEEE 802.15.4g Smart Utility Network (SUN), e.g., see [145, 144] for further
studies. The grid sensor network is much less vulnerable to malicious attacks and is
designed as surveillance guards in the distribution grid. Moreover, deploying grid sensors
on lines/feeders (as low-voltage sensors) brings utilities a number of potential benefits:
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Figure 5.5 A neighborhood distribution network deployed with a number of grid sensors
in (a) overdetermined case, and (b) sufficient case.
1) greater transparency and stability can be achieved owing to the substantial observability
of power flow conditions on each segment and portion of the network, 2) voltage fluctuation
due to varying input of renewable energy sources (e.g., household/neighborhood-based PV
solar systems) can be effectively monitored, and 3) optimization in volt-var control and
optimal power flow operations can be intelligently performed. Hence, utility operators
will have a full knowledge of their supervised network topologies in terms of geographical
locations with coordinates of grid sensors as well as smart meters while monitoring the
network quality and ensuring cyber-physical security. At this stage, all deployed grid
sensors are assumed intrusion resistant and their measurement data are trustworthy (i.e.,
false alarm rate is zero) so that the measurement data of smart meters can be compared
with that of grid sensors to detect and identify any falsified data by compromised smart
meters.
As discussed in Sec. 5.3, the existing distribution grid is not transparent to the utilities
to a certain degree. The design of sensor grid placement can help provide topological
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observability by deploying a sufficient number of grid sensors to guarantee state estimation
solvability. In Figure 5.5a, every grid line is placed with a sensor that results in an
overdetermined system. In order to reduce the redundancy to a sufficient number while
observability is still satisfied, a grid-placed sensor (GPS) algorithm is proposed, as shown
in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Grid-Placed Sensor (GPS) - loop free
1: Input: Given a connected, undirected spanning tree graph G(VT , ET ) with depth DT =
1, 2, . . . , d information.
2: Output: An observability indicator matrix IO that represents observability status of

each edge.
3: Place a GS node at the root node’s edge.
4: for ∀d ∈ DT do
5:

Determine the number of children u of v(d), ∀v ∈ VT

6:

if u = 1 then

7:
8:
9:

No GS node is placed.
else if u > 1 then
A GS node is placed on any (u − 1) of the u edges connected to the child, and
mark 1 for the GS-placed edges in IO .

10:

end if

11:

Repeat for other v if having the same d.

12: end for

For the considered spanning tree illustrated in Figure 5.5b, the network graph
G(VT , ET ) with depth levels 1, 2, . . . , d ∈ DT is constructed by a set of EP and SM
nodes v1 , v2 , . . . , vn ∈ VT and a set of edges ET , where NSM ⊆ VT , NEP ⊆ VT , |VT | =
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|NSM | + |NEP |, and |.| is the cardinality. In Figure 5.5b, the white circles are the EP nodes
and black circles are the SM nodes. At the beginning, the GS node v1 is directly placed
on the edge between the generation source and distribution bus, i.e., v2 . In the next step,
the algorithm starts with EP node v2 and discovers that it has two children, which can be
EP or SM nodes. Either e(v2 , v3 ) or e(v2 , v16 ) placed with a GS node v15 in between will
make both edges become observable, according to Def. 4 in Sec. 5.2. Note that e(w, v)
or e(v, w) denotes the edge e that connects both node w and v. Both edges becoming
observable are then marked with 1 in the n × n observability matrix IO . Repeat the process
for the right branch. The algorithm starts with EP node v16 and discovers that it also has
two children. Consequently, either e(v16 , v19 ) or e(v16 , v17 ) placed with a GS node v18 will
make both edges become observable; again, the two observable edges are marked with 1 in
IO . Notably, although SM node v17 has metering capability to make e(v16 , v17 ) observable
already, the GS node v18 is placed in order to later verify whether or not the measurement
data of SM node v17 is legitimate. The process is repeated until it reaches the leaves with
the largest d.
Theorem 3. The entire spanning tree network is said to be (sufficiently) observable if G −
IO = 0.
Proof. Both G and IO are n × n matrices. Every edge connecting two nodes that exists
in the network topology is marked with 1 in G, and 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, every
existing edge in the network that becomes observable after running the GPS algorithm is
marked with 1 in IO , and 0 otherwise. Therefore, an observable network will make both G
and IO matrices identical.
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Theorem 4. In a spanning tree topology scenario where the EP node cannot be a leaf and
the SM node must be a leaf, the number of GS nodes placed on edges for the network to be
observable is the same as the number of SM nodes.
Proof. In the GPS algorithm, each process starting from the EP node of the root determines
the number of children the EP node has. The algorithm starts adding (u − 1) GS nodes to
u children of the associated EP node, until it reaches the leaf with the largest d. With the
condition where there always exists a SM node as a leaf connected to its parent EP node,
the total number of GS nodes will eventually sums up to |NSM | − 1 in addition to the GS
node at the root.

5.4

Simulations and Results

Two types of simulations are conducted in this chapter in order to analyze the outcomes of
the proposed CONSUMER attack model as well as grid sensor placement for detecting the
attack, respectively.

5.4.1

Study of Successful CONSUMER Attacks in Different Constraint Scenarios

In the first simulation, a value of 5kWh is set for the actual amount of power the attacker
consumes at a certain time period and it aims to lower the consumption for what it actually
pays to four differently reduced values (4kWh, 3kWh, 2kWh, and 1kWh); this means that
the rest of power has to be compensated by a number of chosen neighboring victims in order
for the attack to be undetected, as shown in Figure 5.6. Three conditions are considered in
terms of the constraint level while the attacker performs such action. In an unconstrained
scenario, there is no upper bound value for the attacker to steal. Therefore, it only needs to
compromise as low as one smart meter from the neighbors (in addition to its own meter to
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Figure 5.6 Requirements for a successful CONSUMER attack under different constraints.
make a total of two) for stealing the four different amounts of power. On the other hand in
the more practical cases where there are upper bounds predetermined at the utility control
centers that the attacker must be aware of for not being detected: an expected amount of
2kWh is set that can be tolerated in fluctuation of customers energy consumption for a
loosely constrained case, and an expected amount of 1kWh for a strictly constrained case.
From the results, it is discovered that more smart meters need to be compromised to achieve
the stealing targets while bypassing detection.
Note that compromising a large number of smart meters is believed to be an
improbable scenario because there are upper and lower bounds for the victims and
attacker’s energy consumption patterns upon which the utility control center constantly
monitors. However, a probable case should be emphasized for which the attacker may
change its strategy to launch p k–sparse attacks where p is the number of attacks and k
is the number of compromised smart meters. In other words, the attacker can perform
the CONSUMER attack by constructing p clustered attacks in which k smart meters are
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compromised simultaneously throughout the network still without being detected. This
interesting attack scenario will be investigated in the future works.

5.4.2

Analysis of Network Observability and Corresponding Detection Rates

In the second simulation, how detection rate varies with different levels of network
observability in terms of the number of grid sensors placed in the network is investigated.

SM
From an attacker point of view, it can have nkSM
of ways to compromise kSM out of
nSM smart meters. Similarly, from a utility defender point of view, the operator has to

GS
determine nkGS
of possible ways that kGS out of nGS grid sensors may become unavailable
and cause partial unobservability of the network when nGS is a sufficient number for the
network to be observable. In the worst case, the detection rate can be as low as zero when
compromised smart meters are next to each other (whether they are connected to the same
parent node or connected to their parents whose edge is shared by each other) and where
exactly the grid sensor becomes unavailable. Two examples may be depicted from Figure
5.5b: 1) the worst undetectable and unidentifiable cases: consider the case that SM nodes
v27 and v28 are compromised and at the same time GS node v26 is unavailable, thus causing
unobservability on e(v25 , v27 ) and e(v25 , v28 ) – the CONSUMER attack on these two smart
meters is undetected; also consider the case that SM nodes v17 and v20 are compromised,
in which case the unavailability of GS node v18 can cause e(v16 , v17 ) and e(v19 , v20 ) to be
unobservable, and hence undetectable on SM nodes v17 and v20 ; and 2) the unidentifiable
but detectable case: consider the case that SM nodes v17 and v23 are compromised and GS
node v18 becomes unavailable, in which case SM node v23 is detected as an attacked node
by observing GS nodes v21 and v24 but SM nodes v17 and v20 cannot be identified whether
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Figure 5.7 Network observability versus detection rate.
one or all of the smart meters are attacked. Hence, SM nodes v17 and v20 must be further
inspected by the utility and therefore, considered as a detected case.
Figure 5.7 shows the average detection rate that considers all possible combinations
of smart meter attacks and grid sensor availabilities. Since the number of smart meters
and grid sensors are identical (proven in Thm. 4), and at the same time the number of
times the smart meters to be attacked and the number of times the grid sensors to become
unavailable are equally likely, the outcomes of the detection rate and grid sensor availability
shown in Figure 5.7 exhibit a linear relationship. From the results, note that the slope of
the detection rate is steeper when the number of grid sensors (as well as smart meters) is
smaller. On the other hand, the slope of the detection rate declines when the number of grid
sensors increases. This means that a smaller network with a lower number of sufficient nGS
deployed is more vulnerable to unobservability as compared to a larger network, given the
same number of GS nodes becoming unavailable.

104
5.5

Summary

In this chapter, a breach of data integrity attributed to false data injection attacks for
the future power grid environment is investigated. An attack model (CONSUMER) is
formulated to illustrate that by compromising smart meters, illegal customer “can steal”
electricity by lowering its energy consumption and raising others in a neighborhood
distribution network.

A novel hybrid intrusion detection system framework that

incorporates power information and sensor placement has been developed to detect
malicious activities such as CONSUMER attacks while the traditional bad measurement
data detectors cannot. An algorithm for placing grid sensors on lines or feeders strategically
throughout a spanning-tree distribution network is proposed to provide sufficient network
observability for aiding detection performance. It has been shown that compromising a
large number of smart meters may be improbable as well as indicated that the attack may
turn into a multiple clustered attack with a few compromised smart meters. It has also been
shown that the detection rate can be improved by the proposed grid sensor placement with
sufficient observability; however, it can also be degraded by unavailability of grid sensors.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

In this dissertation, extensive simulations have been conducted to substantiate the viability
of the proposed solutions in tackling the three potential problems in the future power
distribution network, namely, power surplus congestion, bidirectional power flows, as well
as energy theft associated with false data injection attacks. Several intriguing questions
raised from this investigation require further studies. For example, the essential attributes
such as packet loss, varying power demands and solar surpluses, and fairness need to be
taken into consideration for the selection of disconnecting solar units proposed in Chapter
3 when the decision is made at the utility control center. These attributes can potentially
alter the network topology at different time periods in terms of selection outcomes, and thus
affect the system performance. Similarly, communications designs for resource allocation
and scheduling to tackle signal interference and traffic under the power-communications
networked system developed in Chapter 4 should be explored further.
Moreover, intrusion detection for the smart grid system (deployed with millions of
smart meters and grid sensors) studied in Chapter 5 will attract further investigation for the
coming years. Below a few insights into some potential research topics associated with the
proposed intrusion detection framework.
1. The complementary detection methods of utilizing power and communications
networks inspection incorporated in the proposed framework can be developed
further to improve detection performance.
2. Grid sensors in Chapter 5 were considered fully trustable. For practical scenarios,
trustworthiness of meters and sensors can be explored to determine possible impacts

105

106
on the proposed intrusion detection framework by addressing uncertainties of
network dynamics in the context of smart grid security, e.g., the attacker can launch
an observability attack by compromising or disabling some of the grid sensors, thus
making intrusion detection more challenging.
3. Further development of effective and efficient countermeasures are desired to cope
with variants of the CONSUMER attack.
4. Grid sensor localization and associated observability studies can be further extended
to grid isolation designs. For example, grid isolation may be employed to prevent
catastrophic failures from cyber-physical attacks, but the grid in islanded mode must
remain observable as well.
5. The proposed CONSUMER attack design, which is currently limited to a one-player
attack, can be extended to a multi-player attack where more than one attacker try
to steal electricity at the same time period. The design can be remodeled as a
cooperative attack for searching a local or global maximum outcome, as well as
a non-cooperative (selfish) game for finding the Nash equilibrium, without being
detected by the detectors. The aforementioned p clustered CONSUMER attacks with
k–sparse compromised smart meters can be further studied.
6. Since smart meters and grid sensors are mounted on power lines/feeders, power
consumption is not a primary concern in the smart grid environment. Moreover,
these devices are likely to have higher capabilities as compared to the traditional or
dust sensors (that perform single detection application) in terms of computation and
memory. In fact, delay is a primary constraint for different smart grid applications
since there can be mission-critical events in addition to routine activities. Therefore,
this critical metric has to be considered while designing bandwidth allocation and
scheduling for different classes of traffic in smart grid communications. However,
the crowded network environment may cause severe interference and measurement
data collisions. A potential solution may be leveraging on the duty-cycle (on and off)
scheduling technique via grid sensors selection in order to reduce or balance network
traffic, while the observability of the power network as well as connectivity of the
communications network is maintained. How to design smart metering networks
and grid sensor networks is still an interesting topic.
7. As compared to traditional WSN studies, power consumption by smart meters and
grid sensors in smart grid communications should be remodeled by incorporating
on-site renewable energy utilization for energy efficiency in parallel with the ongoing
research on green communications. Additionally, the concept of data aggregation in
the smart grid context is also different from that in legacy WSN. Most of meters and
sensors installed on lines/premises carry significant measurement data and cannot
be fused in a traditional way because they effectively represent particular state
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conditions and individual loads that are utilized for monitoring/billing purposes at
the utility control center.
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